A Short Commentary on the Summit of the Americas

By Ana Carolina Aranda-Jan. Ana Carolina Aranda-Jan is a Postgraduate Research Student in Politics and International Relations at University of Southampton.


U.S. loss of hegemony, Venezuela the loser, and the international presence of Latin America.

The 2015 Summit of the Americas (SOA) was an historical event in Latin American history. The Summit was first launched by U.S President Bill Clinton in 1992, as a series of meetings that brings together leaders of countries in Latin America. Historically, characterized of being led by the U.S agenda, the programme was different. This year was the first time in the over 20-year history of the SOA that Cuba was allowed to attend. It may be early to celebrate that the event brought together Cuba and the U.S however, this rapprochement could somehow distracted the purpose of the meeting: pursuing a common quest for regional solutions to its many challenges. It is important that the countries work to make this forum a space of discussion where differences and the show of who will say what and what the reactions might be, are put aside.

While the U.S. domestically beginning an interesting political moment with three strong “Latino” candidates; Ted Cruz, Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio, pursuing the Oval Office in 2016, Obama travelled to Panama with a friendly face and relaxed attitude towards the meeting. By leaving the presidency in 2016, now there is nothing to lose and what happens in Panama is of relatively little importance, right? However, under the regions eyes it is undeniable that the U.S. does not lead the agenda of the summit anymore and debate about this country’s hegemony over the region has increased. 

We will have to see what happens with the U.S. and its relations in the region. Apparently, the U.S. will try to have a more active role in negotiating its economic and development policies with the countries in the region. In fact, we already started to see the first trips of different representatives of the U.S. to Cuba, for example. Let’s follow what happens with the meeting that the governor of NY is set to hold in Cuba.

Evidently the winner of the summit is Cuba. This is not because of the positive opinion of its participation at the summit but because of the presence of the U.S., giving stability to the current political and economic situation in the country.  It seems that Cuba and the U.S. are helping each other in generating stability in both countries. In contrast, the loser of the summit is Venezuela. Has anti-American discourse stopped being important? Without succeeding in lifting the decree of Venezuela as a “threat”, President Maduro’s weakness as a political leader is evidently. Moreover, there was a clear absence of unconditional support from Cuba (see Joaquin Roy).

Finally, the presidents of Mexico, Argentina and Brazil went unnoticed. They are the presentation of the counter-examples in the development models that they are pursing. Brazil and Dilma with the Petrobras scandals and the protests in the streets back home, Mexico with the kidnaping and killing of 43 students in Iguala and a security crisis; and Argentina with the Nisman case. This shows, evidently, that interesting times are coming in Latin-American.

Finally, the presence of Latin America at the international level is growing. Among different things happening in Latin America currently impacting the world, I leave just the ideas of a young Latin American politician that caused commotion in social networks this week, with a video of her participation at the first Ibero-American Youth Parliament held in Zaragoza reproaching populism from left and right-wing governments in Latin American (see Gloria Alvarez).

Polling Observatory Latest #GE2015 Forecast: the Conservatives make slight gains, but the likeliest result is deadlock

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


As we enter the closing stretch of the campaign, substantial uncertainty remains about the final outcome. Taking out the random noise, the polls are still showing a close race ahead of May 7th. Some have pointed to differences between telephone and internet pollsters, with the former having shown a steady, if slight, Conservative lead all year. Our method allows us to control for systematic differences between polling houses and variation in the ‘poll of polls’ that is due to changes in the mix of pollsters in the field at a given point in time.

The latest Polling Observatory forecast covers all polls completed up until April 30th, and shows support for the two main parties is still in the balance – with Labour on 33.1% and the Conservatives on 34.2% — though the confidence intervals are such that we cannot say for certain that the Conservative lead is greater than zero.

Our vote forecast points to a higher level of support for the Conservatives than two weeks ago, up 1.4 points at 35.0%, with Labour on 32.6%, up 0.1 points. This reflects the squeeze that the “big two” have put on other parties in the final weeks of the campaign. The Conservative lead now stands at 2.4%, but with considerable uncertainty remaining in our forecast.

Forecast 01-05-15

This slight shift in the balance of polling is reflected in our latest seat estimates. The Conservatives’ median estimate rises by six seats, Labour falls by six seats, and the Liberal Democrats fall by four.  This puts the median Conservative seat lead at just two. However, as the confidence intervals attached to our estimates reveal, this projected lead is highly uncertain, a veritable coin-flip, with a 53 per cent chance that the Conservatives will have more seats than Labour. A majority for either is at present very unlikely, e.g., the likelihood of a Conservative majority is tiny (less than 0.2%). Our estimates further reflect the gains made by the SNP in recent polling in Scotland, with the nationalists now forecast to win 54 out of 59 seats north of the border.

Table 1: Seat estimates, with confidence intervals and change on April 15th

Party March 1st estimate April 1st estimate April 15th estimate April 30th estimate
Conservative 265 271 268 274 (+6)

(251,305)

Labour 285 276 278 272 (-6)

(244, 295)

Liberal Democrat 24 27 28 24 (-4)

(18, 29)

UKIP 3 3 3 2 (-1)

(1, 4)

SNP 49 49 49 54 (+5)

(46, 58)

Others 6 6 6 6

(4, 8)

Northern Ireland (not forecast) 18 18 18 18

The Conservatives’ paths to a governing coalition are even more winding than their slight lead in votes and seats. They cannot reach a majority with the backing of the Liberal Democrats (combined 298 seats, 15 short of a majority) or with both the Liberal Democrats and the Northern Irish DUP (combined 306 seats, assuming the DUP once again win 8 seats), or even by adding UKIP to that two party combination (308 seats total). It would be very hard, with this seat outcome, for the Conservatives to sustain a government without some form of acquiescence from the SNP. Things are rather more promising for Labour.  While they cannot reach a majority with the help of the Liberal Democrats (combined 300 seats), they can with SNP.  Whether that happens remains to be seen, of course.

Table 2: Most plausible governing combinations, based on March and April seat forecasts

Party March 1st estimate April 1st estimate April 15th estimate April 30th estimate
Conservatives + Lib Dems + DUP 298 307 305 306
Conservatives + Lib Dems + DUP + UKIP 301 310 308 308
Labour + SNP 334 325 327 326
Labour + Lib Dem 309 303 306 300
Labour + SDLP + Plaid Cymru + Green + Lib Dem 316 310 313 307
Labour + Lib Dem + SNP 358 352 355 354
Labour + SDLP + Plaid Cymru + Green + Lib Dem + SNP 365 359 362 361

Our projected numbers suggest that while the ballots may all have been counted by May 8th, the shape of the new government may be up in the air for some time after.

Update: we have mow updated our forecast with all polls up to the end of Tuesday 5th May, giving the final Polling Observatory forecast for this parliament:

Conservatives 34.5% (32.6, 36.4)

Labour 32.4% (29.7, 35.2)

Liberal Democrats 8.7% (6.9, 10.6)

In terms of seats, this translates into:

Labour 273 (246, 295)

Conservatives 271  (248, 299)

Liberal Democrats 24 (19, 28)

Scottish National Party 55 (49, 59)

Ukip 2 (1, 4)

Other 6 (4, 9)

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

New Book: The Relevance of Political Science

By Gerry Stoker, Professor of Governance at University of Southampton and Fellow and Centenary Professor in the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis at University of Canberra (Twitter). You can read more posts by Gerry Stoker here.


There are some who hold the view that the job of political scientists begins and ends with their description and analysis of politics. Many political scientists view the connection between the discipline and the world of politics as appropriately detached: they are neutral, observers of the political world. Yet my position is that a discipline that studied politics but had nothing to say to those involved in politics or who might be involved would be failing. Political science needs to devote more thought and effort to the challenges involved in achieving relevance for its work.

Political science should as part of its vocation seek not to pursue an agenda driven by its own theories or methods as if it was in a separate world , sealed off from the concern of its fellow citizens. Rather the problems of the political world as perceived, or at least as can be understood, by our fellow citizens should set the bulk of our agenda. We should be asking questions to which others outside the profession want to know the answer. And do so with a commitment to rigour in methods of study and analysis. A focus of relevance mean does not demand a downplaying of developing the best means of investigating politics. Indeed methodological innovation is, if anything, likely to be simulated rather than hindered by such dealing with the intractable and complex challenges thrown up by ‘real world’ politics. There is nothing as practical as good theory and theory can find no tougher test than achieving effectiveness in the world of practice.

Too often in the past three or four decades political science has constructed for itself a way of working that appears to give little or no credence to the demands of relevance. If political science is therefore judged irrelevant by others, most of the blame though not all rests with the profession. Political science will need to act differently and so I offer a new manifesto for relevance below.

  1. Have confidence in the value of rigorous scientific analysis and so do not let relevance compromise high quality investigation but embrace it as a critical friend, providing tough and different challenges for your evidence and argument
  2. Develop relevance not as an afterthought in the construction of your research but put it at the heart of what you select to investigate and how you present and share the outputs of your research. Set your agenda in dialogue with others outside the profession and improve your communication skills using traditional and new media
  3. Offer solutions as well as analysis of problems and take on board some of the arguments for a design orientation in your analysis so that evidence and argument can be applied as thoroughly to the construction of potential answers as well as spelling out the challenges facing desired change
  4. Support methodological pluralism in the discipline as that variety of approaches is most likely to deliver a rich array of relevant work that can reach out to a diverse group of potential users
  5. Be committed to work in partnership with other disciplines to improve the relevance of your work. Good and innovative work often is cross-disciplinary. Many issues have a “wicked” or multi-dimensional quality so again working across disciplinary boundaries enhances the chances of relevance
  6. Actively cultivate links with intermediaries as appropriate – think tanks, journalists, special advisors, political parties, citizens’ organisations and social media networks- in order to boost the relevance of your work
  7. Celebrate the role of teaching as a means of delivering relevance by encouraging a cadre of critically aware citizens and policymakers.

These ideas and the complexities and challenges involved in achieving relevance are explored by a stellar group of experienced political scientists from around the world in a recently published book The Relevance of Political Science.

New PAIR Research Funding: Prime Ministerial Accountability to Parliament

Image: Parliamentary copyright

Dr Alexandra Kelso, Associate Professor of Politics, has recently won Nuffield Foundation funding for a one-year research project examining ‘Prime Ministerial Accountability to Parliament’. The project, which will begin in June 2015, is in collaboration with Dr Mark Bennister (Canterbury Christ Church University) and Dr Phil Larkin (University of Canberra), and will examine the evidence sessions held by the House of Commons Liaison Committee with the Prime Minister, in order to analyse the scrutiny and accountability potential of these sessions. While Prime Minister’s Question Time gets a lot of media attention – and a lot of criticism – few are aware of these more low-profile accountability occasions through which the Prime Minister is asked very detailed questions about the government’s policies and decisions. The research will seek to illuminate this little understood area of parliamentary work.

The team will work closely with the parliamentary clerks and MPs involved with these evidence sessions, in order analyse their accountability contribution, and to provide recommendations for how this form of scrutiny might be improved. The project also involves national and international comparative work, to find similar examples of prime ministerial accountability in other political systems and to learn from them.

This is an exciting piece of research, which is positioned to make significant contributions to our understanding of both the limits and the possibilities of democratic accountability mechanisms. The Nuffield Foundation Open Door programme funds projects which scrutinise constitutional and legislative processes in order to identify opportunities for reform. For more details, see: http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/government-and-constitution

National Voting Rights for Resident Non-Citizens: The Luxembourg Debate

By David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at University of Southampton (@rdavidowen, Academia.edu). You can find more posts by David here.


On June 7th 2015, the people of Luxembourg will be voting in a referendum covering four separate questions:

  • Should teenagers aged 16 or over be given the active right to vote? (The active right means that they would be able to vote but not stand in elections.)
  • Should non-Luxembourg nationals be allowed to vote in national elections on the condition that they have lived in Luxembourg for at least ten years?
  • Should the state continue to pay salaries and pensions of priests, diocese staff or officials of other faith groups in Luxembourg?
  • Should government mandates be limited to a period of ten years?

Although all raise fascinating points for political theory and practice, it is the second – national voting rights for resident non-citizens – that raises the most challenging issues for contemporary states in contexts of migration and for EU member states in the context of the right to freedom of movement enjoyed by EU citizens. On the 20th-21st March I was privileged to be invited as an expert in a wide-ranging intellectual debate on this issue held in the Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg in which a group of historians, lawyers, sociologists and political scientists presented a range of perspectives on resident non-citizen suffrage to an audience of parliamentary representatives, activists, academics and students. Organized by Professor Philippe Poirier and his colleagues at the University of Luxembourg with the cooperation of the Luxembourg Parliament in order to enhance political debate, the event exemplified how academic research can inform, and be challenged by, the diversity of political perspectives that characterize a democratic state.

The question of resident non-citizen suffrage in national elections has real political significance for Luxembourg. About 45% of its residents are non-citizens (with about 85% of these being EU citizens). On the one hand, this looks like a serious democratic problem with almost half the population being denied national political representation in its legislative body. On the other hand, it is easy to see that the people of Luxembourg might reasonably be concerned that permitting national suffrage rights to resident non-citizens would undermine their ability to control their own political destiny.

One response to this dilemma is to make acquisition of nationality relatively straightforward and on the 1st January 2009 Luxembourg introduced new naturalization legislation that permitted dual/plural nationality and a double ius soli principle. This has had significant impact:

The number of valid demands for nationalisation quadrupled, going from 1065 in 2008 to 11770 for the period of the 1st January 2009 to the 31 December 2011. The Luxembourgish nationality was granted to 11736 persons, quasi 4000 per year. … By comparison, in 2008, only 1215 persons acquired the Luxembourg nationality. Furthermore, by double ius soli, 3414 persons of less than 18 years age, born in the Grand-Duchy of foreign parents of whom one was also born in Luxembourg, acquired Luxembourg nationality on the 1st January 2009. Following the assessment of the STATEC (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies), from 2009 to 2011, approximately another 1000 children became Luxembourgers by double ius soli, and 2491 children were naturalised along with one of their parents. A total of about 18500 new Luxembourgers in three years, mainly because of the innovations introduced by the law of 2008.

However, as already noted, the number of resident non-citizens today is c.45% with c.85% being EU citizens. For Luxembourg, it seems a decision must be made.

The vote in Luxembourg is also, however, also significant for the EU. Currently the EU has a demos problem in that EU citizens who exercise their civil right of freedom of movement may find themselves disenfranchised at the national voting level in both their state(s) of nationality and their state of residence. This is a democratic wrong but it is one that the EU as an institution has no competence to resolve. There are several possible ways of resolving this problem. But given (a) that the institutional architecture of the EU is neither purely intergovernmental (which would support tying national voting rights to naturalization) or purely federal (which would support tying national voting rights to residence) and (b) that EU citizenship entitles EU citizens who move to other member states to be treated as de facto dual nationals for a wide range of purposes, one fitting way of addressing this problem would be for Member States to allow such Second Country Nationals to become ‘Resident Electors’ after a reasonable period of residence. A ‘Yes’ vote in Luxembourg’s referendum (although it would also encompass a small number of non-EU citizens) would provide an example to the EU of such a practice. A ‘No’ vote would push the agenda in the direction of either reciprocal arrangements between specific Member States or expatriate voting rights for Second Country Nationals or some combination of the two. Luxembourg’s decision thus has implications that are wider than its own national affairs – and it is also for this reason that the engagement of academics, citizens and politicians in the event organized by the University of Luxembourg in association with their Parliament was such a welcome endeavor.

Obama and the Latino Vote: Falling in Love Again?

DipticBy Dr. Ana Margheritis, Reader in International Relations at University of Southampton (Twitter, Academia.edu). You can find more posts by Ana here.


A bold attempt to regain initiative capacity is shaping the last years of Obama’s second term in office. In late 2014 he announced the launching of two executive actions of great impact in domestic and foreign policy: a relief program to stop the deportation of millions of undocumented migrants (mostly from Latin America) and the initiation of conversations to reestablish relations with Cuba. These two decisions affect directly sectors of the electorate of Hispanic origin that have been crucial in his electoral victories. It is plausible then to expect that these measures will have some repercussions in the next electoral cycle. David Ayón and I addressed the roots and (still uncertain) fate of these initiatives in our publication entitled “Obama’s Latin Turn: A Strategy of Structural Change?” forthcoming next month in Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica.

We argue that the content and timing of this policy shift cannot be understood without taking into account the evolving demographic and political profile of the highly diverse but increasingly integrated Latin American immigrant groups in the US, and in particular their role in domestic politics. We trace the careful crafting of a special relationship between the president since he was presidential candidate and the community of Hispanic origin, the use of specific tools and policies, the arduous negotiations to cope with obstacles to immigration reform, the launching of executive actions to overcome the stalemate, and the subtle mechanisms that allowed Obama to rely on the Latino vote to win elections since 2008. The historical and statistical account in our article leads us to questions of relevance for political scientists and practitioners alike: Is the next presidential election the opportunity for Democrats to forge a new structural and sustainable re-alignment in the party’s electoral coalition? Would this finally be “the time of change” as Obama announced it in his first campaign?

Far from predicting an outcome, we point out to the potential impact of the presidential leadership on the articulation of electoral and governing coalitions in the long term. We place this variable in historical context and in a broader domestic politics dynamic. Here are some of our points.

First, we note that it would be problematic to generalize about a proper “latin” community. Immigrants of Hispanic descent in the US are a highly diverse group. Their potential capacity to mobilize politically is proved and, therefore, they have to be included in candidates’ political calculus. But the formation of a coherent and independent front is still a matter of controversy. In addition, their voting turnout is still very low.

Second, we build upon other studies to show that Latinos’ electoral behavior is likely to be shaped by a number of factors, not just the fate of immigration reform. As Matt Barreto and Gary Segura explain in detail in Latino America: How America’s Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation, the latino vote has been influenced by several factors lately: immigration matters to (mostly first generation) immigrants but they also care about questions of equality, religion, security, economics, and candidates’ ties with the community. Thus, the overall impact of recent presidential actions on the entire Latino community may be limited. And it would be misleading to assume that Latinos might act as a captive constituency for any party.

Third, we note that electoral times often polarized political views on controversial issues. Over the years, Obama managed to maintain hope and positive expectations alive among Latinos, despite generalized disappointment with lack of effective changes. The Hispanic community took note of outreaching moves such as the appointment of high-rank officials of Hispanic descent, the push to the Dream Act, and presidential opposition to a very controversial immigration law in Arizona. It also took note of the latest bold initiatives above. According to a Gallup’s survey, immediately after the announcement of such measures Obama’s popularity among Hispanic-Americans increased by 12 points, rewarding him with a 64% of performance approval. Would it possible to maintain that rate of approval if the Executive cannot unlock institutional vetoes? This is an open question since the presidential decisions are facing opposition not only in Congress but also from federal courts (see details in the recent analysis of the Migration Policy Institute: http://migrationpolicy.org/article/all-eyes-us-federal-courts-deferred-action-programs-halted).

Fourth, from a historical perspective, we learned not to overestimate the president’s capacity to have an impact on the performance of its party, especially in the case of a president in his last term, without any chance to be re-elected. Bruce Caswell reminds us in “The Presidency, The Vote and The Formation of New Coalitions” (Polity 41, 2009) that only Ronald Reagan managed to pass the presidency along to his successor from his party and only for one term. He also points out that Obama increased evenly the support of Hispanics and other minorities in past elections but he did not bring new groups to the traditional electoral coalition of Democrats. Thus, the next presidential elections will be crucial to assess if Latinos (especially, the younger generation) have really become incorporated in the Democrats’ electoral coalition on more integrated and permanent basis than in the past.

Thus far, re-gaining initiative capacity and projecting a positive message focused on economic recovery as Obama did in his last speech to Congress in January 2015, attest of the president’s strategic shift and might increase the electoral chances of his party. It is not clear yet how presidential bold moves articulate with a broader economic and political dynamic and to what extent institutional vetoes may be overcome. For most migrants of Hispanic origin, the trip “to the North” is embedded in deeply-rooted expectations of a better standard of life and improvement for individuals, families, and communities. But the conditions that may allow them to “reclaim the American dream” –as Obama called it in his book The Audicity of Hope—are largely beyond the control of the president.

In sum, we note that forging a governing coalition that might advance a “Latin agenda” as well as other innovative policies is a crucial challenge today –and probably the most uncertain aspect of Obama’s departure. The imprint that Obama is giving to his last term will probably raise his profile and mark his legacy. It might also have just a short-term effect and limited scope if other political actors do not endorse or negotiate his initiatives within a broad political agreement supportive of structural changes.

Unsettling Patriarchy: Tackling the Gendered Injustices of Colonialism in Liberal Democracies

By Michael Elliott, Visiting Research Fellow in the Centre for Citizenship, Globalization and Governance at the University of Southampton (Academia.edu).


Indigenous women stand amongst the most marginalised and vulnerable of groups within contemporary liberal democracies. This fact has been recognised for some time, but was affirmed again last week in a report published by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It highlighted the patterns of severe disadvantage, discrimination, and violence – including sexual violence and murder – to which Indigenous women in Canada are routinely exposed, and lamented the general lack of sufficient action being taken to address them. The same story could also be told of other advanced liberal democratic ‘settler’ states such as Australia, New Zealand, and USA.

In the wake of the CEDAW report, and as we find ourselves sandwiched neatly between International Women’s Day (8th March) and International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (March 21st), this seems as opportune a time as any to reflect upon this issue.

Gendered colonialism

The distinct form of oppression to which Indigenous women in settler societies are today subject is, by any standards, complex. Since the earliest days of European colonial presence in the so-called ‘New World’, through subsequent processes of settlement and state-building, and within the contemporary legislative and policy frameworks of liberal democratic governance, the positions of Indigenous women have come under particular and consistent attack.

To some extent, this must be understood in the context of wider racist and sexist cosmologies that have dominated (and in many ways dominate still) Western societies, and which have conspired to ensure a special disregard for Indigenous women. But there is also another side to this story that is rooted more in the realm of strategic reasons. Undermining the power and status of Indigenous women in a specific sense has formed a key part of attempts to weaken the social cohesiveness of Indigenous groups more generally, and with it their resistance to colonial processes and the advancement of state interests.

Accordingly, measures designed to diminish the power of Indigenous women within their communities (and outside of them), to separate them from important social and cultural networks, and to cut them out of the economy, have been a consistent feature of settler-colonialism. One need only witness the legacy of sexist provisions in the Indian Act in Canada for indication of this. Set in the broader context of colonial domination, these gendered attacks have carried dire repercussions.

Gender relations in many communities have been seriously distorted at the same time that social mechanisms for tackling abuse and discrimination have been dramatically eroded. In wider society, gendered oppression has been compounded by entrenched forms of racial discrimination. The result is that Indigenous women in settler-colonial contexts today find themselves negatively positioned in social relationships of all kinds – that is, in respect of Indigenous men as well as non-Indigenous men and women – and suffer a host of disadvantages and vulnerabilities as a result. In terms of socio-economic status, health, employment, housing, political representation, and in many other areas besides, serious disparities have emerged.

But if the factors underpinning such disadvantage are complex, then taking effective measures to address it is even more so. For, the fact is that colonial domination is not some distant aspect of history for most Indigenous groups in settler societies today. It is, rather, an active feature of daily life. The presence of external authority over Indigenous lands and populations has never been removed, and neither has the sense of injustice and threat that comes with it.

One consequence of this is that efforts to address patterns of female subordination can come into conflict with broader struggles against colonial domination. Where emancipatory movements around gender seem to draw on the resources of dominant society (both material and intellectual), and especially where they serve to cast doubt on the representative legitimacy of Indigenous governments and other organisations pressing for political change, there is real potential for friction with wider ‘decolonisation’ projects.

The result is that gender-based struggles often carry a certain controversy for many Indigenous communities, and have historically tended to become somewhat peripheralised as a result. This does not excuse, but has nevertheless abetted, a general lack of sufficient commitment amongst state actors to tackle such disadvantage – who, for better or worse, are currently best equipped in terms of resources and power to take decisive steps to promote change. The combined result is that disproportionate patterns of injustice and suffering borne by Indigenous women have persisted despite relatively wide acknowledgement.

How can progress be realised?

The very broad brushstrokes I have painted with here undoubtedly gloss over a great deal more complexity, controversy, and contextual nuance. Nevertheless, this rudimentary picture can at least provide traction for some initial thoughts on finding a more effective response to this issue.

And we might benefit here from separating two things: (1) the overall fact of oppression on the one hand; and (2) vulnerability to the most dire consequences of that oppression on the other. This is a precarious separation at best (both conceptually and practically speaking), but nevertheless can be of use in this case.

Taking the vulnerability question first: the CEDAW report emphasised that susceptibility to violence, poor health, and the worst effects of discrimination is exacerbated by the low socio-economic status of Indigenous women. Tackling this dimension of disadvantage must therefore represent an absolute priority.

In the current context, this can only be done with the full backing and support of the state. And whilst some notable steps have been taken in this regard by liberal governments in recent years, continuing patterns of violence and suffering attest to the need for a great deal more action. This will inevitably evoke significant antagonisms for groups struggling against the broader context of colonial domination. However, these might be reduced (to at least some extent) by resourcing Indigenous organisations to take the lead in the design and implementation of response programmes. The state could also take a responsible step here by refusing to appropriate such moves in efforts to consolidate its own position in ongoing disputes of colonial injustice.

However, tackling acute vulnerability is clearly only one part of the issue. And whilst such measures ought to carry broader positive repercussions in their own right, these will be limited if the background conditions of Indigenous women’s oppression are not simultaneously addressed.

This is by far the more difficult question, and one that lacks a clear or simple answer. Undoubtedly, though, without significant advancement in confronting the enduring fact of colonial domination – including the specific scenes of dispossession and disempowerment that currently characterise it – attempts to tackle its consequences are likely to fall desperately short. Gender-specific patterns of injustice certainly cannot simply be subsumed into this broader category of colonial injustice, but neither can they be treated in isolation from it. Achieving significant progress in respect of either inescapably requires addressing them together.

The kind of broad and unified commitment needed to make real moves in this direction presently seems (to put it generously) unlikely. But without it, it is difficult to see how the patterns noted in Canada in the CEDAW report – and felt equally acutely in other settler-colonial contexts – will improve significantly. As difficult as an open and committed confrontation with not only the past but also the ongoing injustices of colonial domination will be for settler societies (and the wider international community), it would seem to be essential if the suffering and rights abuses currently experienced by Indigenous women are to be properly addressed.