Argentina departs from the Kirchner model, but Mauricio Macri now has to govern a divided nation

By Pia Riggirozzi. Pia Riggirozzi is Associate Professor in Global Politics at the University of Southampton ( You can find more posts by Pia here.

Read Dr Pia Riggirozzi’s new piece for The Conversation on the outcome of Argentina’s 2015 presidential elections.

Follow this link for the full article.

Polling Observatory #1: Estimating support for the parties (with some trepidation…)

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.

This post is part of a long-standing series (dating to before the 2010 election) that reports on the state of the parties as measured by vote intention polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates can be found here.

It is now six months since the television headlines rolled at 10am on May 7th, with the exit poll dropping the bombshell that the polls had got it badly wrong. The election forecasters fared little better, including us: even though our vote model had predicted a Conservative lead of 2-3 points, our seat prediction was nowhere close to the majority achieved by David Cameron. It is with a little trepidation then that the Polling Observatory team returns to provide its assessment on the state of public opinion in late 2015.

As regular readers will know, we pool all the information that we have from current polling to estimate the underlying trend in public opinion, controlling for random noise in the polls. Our method controls for systematic differences between pollsters – the propensity for some pollsters to produce estimates that are higher/lower on average for a particular party than other pollsters. While we can estimate how one pollster systematically differs from another, we have no way of assessing which is closer to the truth.

One possibility with this method is to use the result of the last election to ‘anchor’ our estimates of bias in the polls against the last election result. This treats the election result as if it was produced by a pollster with no systematic error. We can then estimate the systematic difference of each pollster with this hypothetical perfect pollster. With this method, for example, if pollster X produces results which are systematically 2 percentage points higher for the Conservatives than what would be produced by this perfect pollster, we would interpret a poll indicating 40% support for the Conservatives from such a pollster as 38% support for the Conservatives. This approach can be useful where there are recurring historical patterns (such as the tendency of the polls to overestimate the Labour vote and underestimate the Conservative vote), and might allow us to control for systematic bias in the polls.

We have chosen, for now, to anchor our estimates on the average pollster. This means the results presented here are those of a hypothetical pollster that, on average, falls in the middle of the pack.[1] We have chosen to use such a middle pollster rather than anchor on the election result because we believe that the inaccuracies/biases revealed in the polls in May will be different from those which may occur in this election cycle.[2] All of the pollsters have been undertaking reviews of their methods following the big polling miss in May, and it is unlikely that the biases in polling will be unaffected by the changes they are gradually introducing. Because of this, we offer our estimates of party support with an important caveat: while our method accounts for the uncertainty due to random fluctuation in the polls and for differences between polling houses, we cannot be sure that there is no systematic bias in the average polling house (i.e., the industry as a whole could be wrong once again). It may be that the polls are collectively right or wrong. It may also be that a pollster producing figures higher or lower than the average is more accurately reflecting the state of support for the parties than their competitors. Our estimates cannot adjudicate on whether figures on the high or the low side for a party better reflect the underlying preference of the electorate. The only test is on Election Day. Fortunately, none of this prevents us from identifying and reporting on the underlying trends over time.

In terms of the overall story, there has been little apparent change in vote preferences since the election in May. This despite the triumphant budget announced by George Osborne, the surprise ascension of Jeremy Corbyn to leader of the Labour Party (and the onslaught on him and his team from outside and inside the party), and the tax credits row that has quickly taken the shine off the government’s honeymoon period. Unlike the last election, there has been no sudden flight of voters from one party to another, as occurred with the collapse of Liberal Democrat support in the first six months after the Coalition government was formed.

Our estimates suggest that Conservative support has slipped slightly since the heady days of May and June, from around 40% to closer to 37% at the start of November. Despite Labour being divided and in some disarray over its direction, it has made slight gains from around 30% to 32%. This upward drift in the polls largely occurred before election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader, so cannot be attributed to a Corbyn effect. Whether these gains will persist as the election nears and PM Corbyn becomes a possibility, is of course open to debate. At present, though, there is no sign of Mr Corbyn’s election having any impact on his party’s overall support. UKIP support has remained steady at around 13%, and the party shows no signs of going away – even with its own internal conflicts following Nigel Farage’s “unresignation” in the summer. Lagging somewhat behind, the Liberal Democrats continue to flat-line at just under 7%. One of the patterns of the last parliament was the stubborn immovability of Liberal Democrat support. New party leader Tim Farron has much work on his hands to win back voters, and so far there are no green shoots for the party in our estimates. Finally, speaking of the Greens, their support appears to have been squeezed since Labour election Jeremy Corbyn – perhaps because voters attracted by their distinct left wing platform now feel more at home in the Labour party. It has fallen around 1.5 points since the summer. Our estimates for all the parties suggest that the electorate is still to make up its mind on both the new government and the fragmented and much changed opposition. But there are some big events on the horizon, in particular the EU referendum, which may yet provide a shock to move political support in one direction or the other.

UK 01-11-15 anchor on average (1)

One of the reasons why the polling miss back in May came as such a shock was that by election eve there was broad consensus among the pollsters about the level of support for the parties (though of course we noted house effects earlier in the campaign). However, in the period since May the polling has been characterised by much more variation in the standing of the parties. This is revealed in the figure above. The size of the confidence intervals for our estimates in the period since the election (an average of 2.3 points) are more than twice those for the 2010-15 election cycle or for the month just before the start of the short campaign (each an average of 1.1 points). This indicates a much higher level of uncertainty about the state of public opinion today. Part of this could be due to a lower volume of polling since May, or more variation in polling methodologies as pollsters take different approaches in response to May’s polling miss. The greater uncertainty may also reflect the much lower frequency of polling since the election – election watchers used to multiple daily polls have now to accept a more meagre diet of one or two polls a week. The greater uncertainty may, however, also reflect something more fundamental: genuine uncertainty, and hence greater volatility, in the minds of the electorate. Voters are faced with an unexpected Conservative majority government and an unfamiliar and polarising opposition leader attracting widely varying reactions in the media and within his own party. In such circumstances many may be genuinely unsure as to their preferences. Only time will tell whether this uncertainty lasts until the next general election. For now, it provides an important reminder of the need to take single poll results with a degree of caution.


Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien


[1] The average difference between this middle pollster and those pollsters that produce estimates that are systematically higher for a given party is the same as the average difference between this middle pollster and those pollsters that produce estimates that are systematically lower for that same party.

[2] We came to a similar conclusion during the last election cycle when it became apparent that our method of anchoring on the election result was excessively reducing the estimated level of support for the Liberal Democrats.


Dr Ana Margheritis on the National Elections in Argentina

DipticBy Dr. Ana Margheritis, Reader in International Relations at University of Southampton (Twitter, You can find more posts by Ana here.

PAIR’s Dr Ana Margheritis has been busy in the national and international media over the past week, offering reflection and analysis on the current national elections in Argentina. Ana has contributed to discussion programmes for Radio FM4 in Austria and for the BBC World Service, and featured in an article in the Daily Express.

You can listen to/view each of Ana’s contributions by following the links above.

PAIR’s Dr Kamil Zwolski commenting on the upcoming Polish election for France 24

By Dr. Kamil Zwolski, Lecturer in Global Politics and Policy at University of Southampton ( You can find more posts by Kamil here.

France 24 snap copy

Kamil Zwolski, Lecturer in Global Politics and Policy at the University of Southampton, has commented on the forthcoming Polish elections for the Paris-based international news and current affairs television channel France 24.

You can view the programme segment by following this link.

Should Parents Choose More Intelligent Children?

By Ben Saunders, Associate Professor in Political Philosophy at University of Southampton (@DrBenSaunders,

The Oxford philosopher Julian Savulescu proposed that, where screening technology is available, parents have a moral obligation to select the children expected to enjoy the best lives. He terms this the principle of procreative beneficence. Unsurprisingly, this principle is controversial and it has been subjected to a number of criticisms, including accusations that it is eugenic. (I have criticised it myself here.)

My latest publication, ‘Procreative Beneficence, Intelligence, and the Optimization Problem’ (forthcoming in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy; doi 10.1093/jmp/jhv026), is a response to another line of criticism.

In a recent piece in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, Adam Carter and Emma Gordon argued that even if we accept the principle of procreative beneficence, the results are less radical than Savulescu suggests. They accept, at least for sake of argument, that parents might have an obligation to choose healthy children rather than those that will suffer (or are likely to suffer) from disease or disability. However, they argue that Savulescu fails to provide a clear example of a non-disease trait that parents have an obligation to select for (or against). In particular, they focus on Savulescu’s favoured example of intelligence, arguing that greater intelligence need not conduce to greater wellbeing.

My paper responds to this criticism, on behalf of Savulescu. First of all, I argue that while greater intelligence does not necessarily improve wellbeing, it is nonetheless plausible that if often does (at least within a certain range). Second, I argue that, even if this is false, Carter and Gordon’s objection to Savulescu succeeds only if the net effect of intelligence on wellbeing is neutral. If, contrary to my earlier argument, intelligence is inversely correlated with wellbeing, then parents should select in favour of lower intelligence.

Finally, I note that the effects of intelligence on wellbeing are likely to vary at different levels, partly for social or positional reasons (for instance, as Carter and Gordon point out, someone much more intelligent than his or her peers may have difficulty finding companions). Consequently, the optimum intelligence, with respect to wellbeing, is unlikely to be either the maximum or minimum possible. Further, this optimum level will likely vary depending upon the reproductive choices of other parents. Thus, the principle of procreative beneficence does make demands on parents, but compliance with these demands is likely to be more difficult than hitherto realised.

Upcoming Conference on Global Migration

This year the Institute for Latin American Studies at the School of Advanced Study, University of London, have situated global issues (including migration) at the top of their agenda for debate. They invited Dr. Ana Margheritis to co-organize an interdisciplinary conference with broad aims. Please find more details in the call for papers and link to webpage below.

Managing Global Migration: New Perspectives from Latin America and Europe

November 12, 2015

Institute of Latin American Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London

This one-day ILAS conference at the University of London will present and debate new research on the multiple ways and means of addressing and managing global migration flows between Latin America and Europe. The conference will move beyond area studies by focusing on two world regions historically linked by human mobility and cultural exchange but now grappling with significant demographic changes and new migration trends. These changes and trends include the reversal of flows, the greater heterogeneity of migrant groups, the pull of women leaders in family migration projects, the concentration of newcomers in non-traditional destinations, the intensification of dual or multiple engagements in the country of origin and residence, and the development of new forms of citizenship beyond borders. The aim of the conference is to assess how and to what extent state and non-state actors in both Latin America and Europe are coping with and capitalizing upon the complex and creative implications of these new trends.

We aim to critically address the need to reconcile the political regulation of new trends in human mobility with democratic and multicultural demands for respect of rights and difference. We welcome papers that address this broad scope and aim from a variety of disciplinary, methodological, experiential, and comparative perspectives. ILAS aims to publish a selection of previously unpublished papers. Limited funding is available for travel expenses of participants. Please submit an abstract of 250 words with short bio and contact information by SEPTEMBER 15 to the conference co-organizers:

Dr. Ana Margheritis, University of Southampton

Dr. Mark Thurner, ILAS, University of London

Demystifying the Climate Crisis: A Review of Naomi Klein’s “This Changes Everything”

By Meg Sherman, a student of Modern History and Politics at University of Southampton.

The global movement to divest from fossil fuels is a clear-thinking, progressive choice for action on climate change. This Changes Everything: Capitalism VS The Climate, a newly published volume by Naomi Klein, provides an invaluable history of environmental and economic injustices and should be required reading for anyone interested in the divestment movement.

The truth on climate change is hard to identify in a world where business is powerfully invested in misinformation. But under the smog of denialism the effects of human-made global warming (via carbon emissions) are already being wrought in real, violent ways upon the planet: ways of life are being extinguished; low-lying pacific islands look set to be swallowed by the sea; global temperatures melt previous records with alarming alacrity, and extreme weather events displacing large populations are fast becoming the norm. Our generation lives throughout the endgame of industrial civilization, a time when humanity urgently needs new, compelling narratives about potential transformations in society, economics and politics. Incisive, compelling and relevant as its predecessors, Capitalism VS The Climate appears as a stray flicker of hope, imploring a thoughtful resistance to predatory capitalism and envisioning a real place for a climate movement with redistributive justice at its’ core.

Following in the path of No Logo and Shock Doctrine, Klein’s latest volume deepens her earlier work exposing the disastrous underbelly of neoliberal globalization. The crux of her argument is that the environmental crisis is itself a consequence of the systematic desolation of the global commons, increasingly privatized and deregulated by centralized trading regimes, dominated by the richer industrialized nations, questing for more control of planetary resources. Shock Doctrine railed against the callousness of structural adjustment regimes which deprived nascent economies in the global south of their health, wealth and stability in order to serve the narrow interests and myopic greed of corporations and profiteers, that is to say, the agenda of the 1%. And in Capitalism VS The Climate Klein, using the aftermath of hurricane Katrina by way of example as to how reconstruction efforts can be hijacked and stymied, argues that global warming itself will be hoisted to the engine of the shock doctrine insofar as business competes to advantage from mounting crises without advancing help, solutions, assistance or attempts to mitigate and alleviate the accruing damage. Instead they use crises cynically as a platform for further deregulation and privatization, undermining public unity and collective solidarity. This is disaster capitalism laid bare: a lethal obstacle to public health and environmental sustainability. Major economies founded on the extraction of fossil fuels and emission of greenhouse gases are the major crisis culprits, stoking inequalities. Key stakeholder groups with historically the least restricted access to resources deriving from this foundation are called upon to amend their high-consumption lifestyles, to rediscover the real need for economic justice, or condemn global citizens to further disaster.

Klein looks to initiatives already underway which speak to hopes of achieving lasting social and environmental security by approximating more conscientious and democratic ways of life. Capitalism VS The Climate integrates the lessons and voices of Cheyenne social movements who live on lands intersected by the Keystone XL pipeline, and who have given life to the concept of stewardship by taking bold leaps forward in the resistance against big oil with public education initiatives empowering citizens to establish clean forms of power production in their own communities, harnessing abundant sources like solar and wind energy. Corporate rhetoric has a canny habit of reframing disastrous policies which attack the lives of vulnerable people as a triumph for democracy as much as it has a way of casting radical change as beyond the spectrum of possibility. But in Klein’s view the alternative is not only clear, but well within the means and creativity of people everywhere:

“with the right kind of public pressure, money can be marshaled not just to rebuild cities and communities, but to transform them into models of nonextractive living… activists can demand everything from free, democratically controlled public transit, to more public housing along those transit lines, powered by community-controlled renewable energy – with the jobs created by this investment going to local workers and paying a living wage.”

When it comes to climate change prominent politicians and business leaders argue that we can overcome it by investing more faith in technological and market-based solutions, perpetuating the idea that we don’t need wholesale social and economic reform to underwrite the transition to a low-carbon future. Klein on the other paw argues that a deregulated system which creates the widespread market failure of climate change has obviously outlived its utility, and she argues for more support for research directed at renewable energies, as a pre-requisite for solving issues of public health and the environment. She is astute when she argues that if you take the warnings of modern climate science to their logical conclusion then we ought to have democratically control over public utilities so that they are governed less recklessly. A well-known truism states that madness is doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results. Einstein put it this way: We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” How, then, can we rely on plutocratic capitalism to solve a problem it created and support the long term needs of life on Earth?

Global forecasts predict another unassailable reality aside climate change, that fledgling economies like Brazil, Russia, India and China, tailed by developing LEDCS, will together surpass the activity of the traditional MEDCs and G7 by the middle of this century. The total energy demanded to support those transitions is huge. And two imperatives are to meet that demand and to do it whilst reducing overall greenhouse gas emissions. Concurrently. An immense challenge. It is clear that climate change is an urgent global issue and getting good policy and functional alternatives on the go is crucial as only this will form the basis for societies and industries to reverse the very damaging practices inherent in current methods of production, to respect the balance of nature, and ensure we put a stop to pollution everywhere to protect the shared lands which sustain life on the planet. And the narrative in Capitalism VS The Climate is driven by a heartfelt wish to open people’s eyes to the collective power we have to create new visions and strategies, real options and choices for progressive, radical change in a future which runs fugitive from the totalizing, destructive ambitions of corporate capitalism.