As a New Sanctions Package Hits Russia, Europe Slips Back into Old-Style Geopolitics

By Dr Kamil Zwolski, Lecturer in Global Politics and Policy at University of Southampton (Academia.edu). You can find more posts by Kamil here.


As a fragile ceasefire just about holds in Ukraine, with shelling reported in the pivotal port city of Mariupol, the EU has announced a new round of sanctions against Russia. Targeted at state-owned firms and Russian officials, the package prompted a predictably spiky Russian rejoinder, with Dmitry Medvedev promising an “asymmetric” response – possibly even extending to the closure of airspace.

Custom Union, Ukraine, EU summit in MinskBut whatever the actual impact of the sanctions, and whatever the fate of the ceasefire, one thing is for certain: thanks to the Ukraine crisis, the landscape of conflict in Europe has been transformed for good.

The story of Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union is always told the same way: after the West triumphed over the East at the end of the Cold War, conventional great-power politics on the continent came to a permanent close. And while conflict has hardly disappeared from Europe, the skirmishes that have popped up since 1990 are no longer major inter-state rivalries.

Instead, the story goes, they result from state collapse, bad governance, transnational crime, or tensions around issues like immigration. We are now more likely to discuss European politics in terms of institutions, integration, transnational actors, norms and values than in terms of the clash of big countries.

In a few short months, Ukraine has changed all that. The debates now raging around Europe’s new geopolitical situation are radically different from the conversation of just a year or so ago.

The West’s fault?

The argument is now not about whether state-versus-state wars will return to Europe, but whether they left in the first place. Some analysts have responded to the Ukrainian fracas by proclaiming that Europe has never really moved on from the drama of the great international face-off.

They point out that, in fact, American and European elites have consistently rolled the EU and NATO eastward towards the Russian border – a process which was always going to lead to a clash of interests.

From this point of view, the West is to blame for the current crisis. The only way out, as some foreign policy “realists” would have it, is to turn Ukraine into a sort of neutral buffer state between NATO and Russia, abandoning all efforts to spread “Western values” and promote democracy in Ukraine.

But over the course of an increasingly fraught summer, this perspective has run up against the mounting evidence of Russia’s very active military engagement in Ukraine, pursued despite protests of innocence.

By the end of August, for instance, evidence had emerged showing that Russian soldiers and various intelligence services have been directly involved in destabilising various parts of Ukraine beyond even the flashpoints in the east.

In fact, recent evidence shows that on August 28, Russian forces invaded and captured the Ukrainian town of Novoazovsk. Ukrainian forces were forced to withdraw, along with Ukrainian border servicemen, who lack any heavy military equipment.

Those developments ended any real debate over whether Russia has been an actor in the war, though the extent and intimacy of its involvement remained subject to heated debate by the time a ceasefire was signed on September 5.

Don’t overestimate the West

But despite all the evidence of Russian involvement, some commentators still hold that all this instability and violence is the fruit of Western policy – what they frame as attempts to “socially engineer” the domestic situation in Ukraine in the years leading up to Euromaidan.

But the fact is that in those years, the West was anything but agreed on Ukraine’s prospects for membership of either NATO or the EU. For example, while Poland had long been strongly advocating EU membership for Ukraine to flatter its own geopolitical ends, the EU as a whole preferred to confine Ukraine to various “cooperation frameworks” rather than hold open, formal membership negotiations.

Meanwhile, the question of the Eurasian Customs Union is still deeply unresolved. Angela Merkel recently stressed that Ukraine is free to join the Union, which also includes Kazakhstan and Belarus. In her words, “the European Union would never make a big conflict out of it, but would insist on a voluntary decision.”

A Ukrainian decision to join the Customs Union would, in fact, be favoured in many European political circles, if only for the stability it might conceivably bring. Still, the Customs Union Summit, which took place in Minsk on August 26, was a key display of how farcically messy European geopolitics have become.

That meeting was formally convened to discuss economic cooperation, but the main hope was that the Russian and Ukrainian presidents would make some kind of effort to resolve the conflict, or at least make some diplomatic progress.

But after a two-hour conversation between the presidents, there was no indication that they had reached any sort of agreement. The participation of a high-level EU delegation, including Catherine Ashton herself, apparently didn’t help either.

It was in further talks in Minsk ten days later that a ceasefire deal was finally agreed – while the EU’s foreign ministers and leaders were occupied at the NATO summit in Wales.

Get it together

Europe is now facing in its deepest geopolitical crisis since 1990, and has a fiendish dilemma on its hands: whether to tighten up security cooperation and risk further isolating Russia (following NATO’s decision to reinforce its eastern flank), or to pragmatically acknowledge that Russia has its own strategic interests – hoping that they remain confined to eastern Ukraine.

Both these approaches are wrong. On the one hand, Russia must be shown in no uncertain terms that what it’s been doing in Ukraine is illegal, ceasefire or no ceasefire, and that it will pay for it in the end. Central and eastern European countries need to be reassured that their larger neighbours actually care about their safety, and can do something real to help shore it up.

But at the same time, political and diplomatic efforts outside of sanctions must be accelerated, not sidelined by military posturing and the wrangling over sanctions. Otherwise the EU will only find itself further sidelined in future negotiations over Ukraine, just as it was in Minsk

In short, the EU urgently needs to get its act together. If it doesn’t, it will have to finally stop pretending it has any sort of common foreign policy, and accept the consequences as they come.

[This article is cross-posted at The Conversation. – Ed.]

Ukraine, Crimea, Russia and International Law’s (In)Capacity: invitation to a debate

By Dr Kamil Zwolski, Politics and International Relations

The language of international law has dominated news coverage and commentary on recent events in Crimea. Most international lawyers have condemned Russia’s ‘unlawful’ use of force and its ‘illegal annexation’ of Crimea.

Reflecting on international legal reaction to recent events in Crimea and public perceptions of international law’s capacity to address such crises, academics from Southampton Law School and Southampton University’s Department of Politics and International Relations will debate the place of international law in the Crimean crisis and ask what it means to brand Russia’s action ‘illegal’. We hope you will join us, and join the debate.

The debate will be held on May 1st at 6pm in Building 46, Lecture Theatre A (Room 3.001).

You can register here.

Russian invasion of Ukraine: analysis from @sotonpolitics

By Dr Kamil Zwolski, Politics and International Relations

We asked some of our postgraduate students in PAIR to share their analysis of the worrying situation in Ukraine, in particular through the lenses of the International Relations theory. Here is what they say:

Charles Webb (MSc Global Politics): Over the past week or so Russian forces have been massing along the border with the Ukraine. Russian forces inside the Crimean peninsula have reportedly surrounded key Ukrainian military infrastructure. On the face of it this appears to be a blatant example of realpolitik. What the Russian Federation aims to achieve, and how, is questionable but what is actually interesting is the reminder of the fragile nature, and concept of, nationalism and ethnicity. The message from elites in the Russian administration is that this move is an attempt to protect “ethnic Russians” from Ukrainian ultra nationalists. Although both sides claim that this latest round of hostility has broken out due to the ousting of “pro-Russian” President Viktor Yanukovych this is just the latest in a long history of conflicts over territory and ethnicity. It is interesting to see the rise of chauvinist nationalism in both the Ukraine and Russia considering their long history of interconnected, and at times interdependent, coexistence. Russia and the Ukraine as we know them today are relatively new social constructs. This, so called, “crisis” is a reminder of the powerful, often irrational, and sometimes fatal, attraction of group identification termed nationalism.

Zhanarbek Janabayev (MSc Governance & Policy): Classic realist John Herz’s (1950) conception of the “security dilemma” seems appropriate in contemporary international relations. After the collapse of the Communist bloc and the dissolution of the USSR prevailed idealistic views were about the future peaceful harmonised world. They assumed the end of Russia’s domination and hegemony in post-Soviet realm. Idealists thought about the failure of the “security dilemma” and that this phenomenon is unnecessary anymore. But the recent events in Ukraine show that idealist’s expectations and predictions are utopian. Russia’s biased interpretation and misperception of Ukrainian democratic uprising against totalitarian and corrupted President Yanukovych caused serious tension between Russia and the West Alliance. Moscow escalates the situation and mistakenly considers the democratic movement as a threat to their national security (idea about possible expansion of the NATO to the East). Miscommunication, mistrust, suspicion, uncertainty and failure of diplomacy triggered Russia-Ukraine conflict. Moreover offensive realist President Putin chose aggressive imperialistic tactic of “first strike” (pre-emptive or preventive attack) and started occupation of Crimea and East part of independent Ukraine. Irrational, inadequate and illogical Russia’s foreign policy against international law might provoke the Ukrainian civil war, Russia-Ukraine war or even Third World War (involving Turkey, Poland, NATO).

John Ackom (MSc Citizenship & Democracy): The actions of the opposition/nationalists to occupy government buildings and streets/parts till the deposed presidents resigns can be explained in the light of realism which see international politics to be a constant struggle or competition in which it is not possible for all parties to benefit; one wins at the expense of the other (win-lose situation). Their decision to engage in dialogue mediated by the European Union, however, can be explained using idealism which thinks that progress is possible through cooperation and that international conflict needs concerted effort from the international community to resolve. Similarly, the Russian occupation of Crimea can be explained using idealism. The theory argues that humans are not by nature evil. Rather, it is the existence of evil institutions like military and ammunitions that provoke individuals and states alike to go to war. By this, the Russians would not have entered Crimea militarily but for their military might. The refusal of the Ukrainian military to surrender in Crimea together with the Russian invasion gives meaning to the realist prescriptions that loyalties of allies should never be assumed. Like Machiavelli, the parties seem to agree that ones national security should never be entrusted to any person (mercenaries).