Lessons for Jeremy Corbyn from the Argentinian left

By Pia Riggirozzi, Associate Professor in Global Politics at the University of Southampton (@PRiggirozziAcademia.edu). You can find more posts by Pia here.


 

Jeremy Corbyn won a decisive victory over Owen Smith in a second Labour Party leadership contest on Saturday. With it Corbyn not only strengthened his authority but also the right to lead his party. This election was interesting on many counts, not least because it opens questions about where political power and legitimacy reside. The emergence of Corbyn in Labour politics has been politically and ideologically divisive from the outset, confirming a chasm between what is considered the Labour establishment, and ‘the people’ who have rallied to Corbyn’s support, including unions and local activists. Corbyn has revealed his intention to give more prominence to ‘the people’, to ‘do things differently’, and to build a more just and decent society. These promises put a spin on the Labour Party, reclaiming its role within the global resistance to neoliberalism.

Take Argentina, for example. From 2001 to 2015, the challenge to neoliberalism came from electorates that refused to accept parties committed to free markets. Furthermore, Kirchnerismo, the movement associated with the legacy of the 12 years administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her late husband Néstor, led on the promise of moving beyond neoliberalism, ‘putting politics at the service of people and the economy at the service of the well-being of all citizens’. And it did so in the context of a global political economy where rising commodity prices and strong commercial and financial links with China gave the Kirchners resources to focus efforts on Argentina’s poor. The nation made significant progress on reducing poverty, introduced universal child benefit plan as well as higher pensions, and the expansion of civil rights, including same sex marriage. But this political project undoubtedly proved to be very divisive. For some, it represented a real commitment to prosperity and the expansion of citizenship rights. For others, it represented a quasi-authoritarian, state-led interventionist system, leading to mistaken exchange rate policies, ruinous energy subsidies and unsustainable fiscal deficit. With the economy slowing and inflation worsening, this polarisation explains Kirchnerism’s defeat in November 2015, and a swing to political and economic conservatism with the election of Mauricio Macri.

As for Corbyn, he won the mandate to do something different and he will thus have to provide an alternative to the unravelling of neoliberalism in the UK, where Labour has so far failed to refashion a social contract of ‘capitalism with a human face’ while Conservatives, caught off-guard by the Brexit vote, double-down on their endorsement to an economic model based on rising inequalities.

Argentina departs from the Kirchner model, but Mauricio Macri now has to govern a divided nation

By Pia Riggirozzi. Pia Riggirozzi is Associate Professor in Global Politics at the University of Southampton (@PRiggirozziAcademia.edu). You can find more posts by Pia here.


Read Dr Pia Riggirozzi’s new piece for The Conversation on the outcome of Argentina’s 2015 presidential elections.

Follow this link for the full article.

Dr Ana Margheritis on the National Elections in Argentina

DipticBy Dr. Ana Margheritis, Reader in International Relations at University of Southampton (Twitter, Academia.edu). You can find more posts by Ana here.


PAIR’s Dr Ana Margheritis has been busy in the national and international media over the past week, offering reflection and analysis on the current national elections in Argentina. Ana has contributed to discussion programmes for Radio FM4 in Austria and for the BBC World Service, and featured in an article in the Daily Express.

You can listen to/view each of Ana’s contributions by following the links above.

All Change in Argentina as Sun Sets on the Kirchner Era

By Pia Riggirozzi. Pia Riggirozzi is Associate Professor in Global Politics at the University of Southampton (@PRiggirozziAcademia.edu). You can find more posts by Pia here.


Argentina’s open presidential primary is over, and the stage is now set for the election in October. With the current president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, constitutionally barred from running again, the autumn poll looks set to be a fight between Argentina’s two main political coalitions.

On the left is Daniel Scioli, the current governor of Buenos Aires province, who leads the official Peronist party Front for Victory. He is Cristina de Kirchner’s candidate of choice, though has stayed shy of taking on an explicitly Kirchnerist political identity. On the right is the current mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri; he heads a coalition of strange bedfellows called Cambiemos (Let’s Change), which comprises Macri’s conservative Republican Proposal party, social democrats, and the Radical Civic Union.

The primary system pits all the parties’ candidates against each other in one poll to determine who runs in the general election. Scioli and the Front for Victory got the biggest share with more than 38%. That sets him up well for the elections in October, bodes well for the nation’s verdict on the highly contentious and deeply personalised Kirchnerist legacy.

Twilight

When Fernández de Kirchner’s term ends in December 2015, she and her late husband and predecessor Néstor Kirchner, who ruled from 2003-7, will have enjoyed the longest unbroken presidential tenure since Argentina became a democracy, in the course of which they left a profound mark on their country. As Juan and Eva Peron did before them, the Kirchners have managed to establish a political style that will bear their name long after Cristina finally leaves office.

Governor Scioli: Cristina’s best hope?
Reuters/Martin Acosta

The political project now known as Kirchnerismo (Kirchnerism) is undoubtedly very divisive. For some, it stands for a return (at least in aspiration) to economic growth, prosperity, and the expansion of citizenship rights, all led by the state. For others, it represents a corrupt quasi-authoritarianism, combined with cynical populism and meddlesome state intervention.

Nonetheless, the expansion of rights and welfare provision under the Kirchners has been so widely welcomed in Argentina that none of this election’s contenders dares to challenge it. And with such a strong consensus on a big tranche of Kirchner-era social policy, the campaign might fast descend into a game of character mudslinging.

That’s partly a factor of the weakness of the candidates themselves. De Kirchner has failed to cultivate a strong heir, and the opposition isn’t faring much better. Cambiemos, for its part, has not developed a convincing and comprehensive political platform to take Argentina in a new direction.

All it seems able to do is mount fierce attacks on the personal and political style of Fernández de Kirchner and her entourage – something the last few years have hardly made difficult.

Counting the days

Throughout their 12 years in office, the Kirchners have been dogged by accusations of corruption, which have badly eroded Fernández de Kirchner’s popularity and legitimacy. Things have only gotten worse in recent years. Discontent and distrust have grown under Kirchnerist statism, with its apparent reluctance to protect private property, and alleged propensity to favour government cronies with subsidies and contracts.

Conflicts with the media and opposition media groups have also led Argentine investigative reporter Jorge Lanata to investigate a possible network of international bank accounts and unaccounted wealth connected with the state.

Things reached a fever pitch when prosecutor Alberto Nisman was found dead in his apartment on January 18 2015. His body was discovered just hours before a judicial inquiry was expecting to examine claims that Fernández de Kirchner and her foreign minister, Héctor Timerman, tried to cover up Iran’s role in the country’s deadliest ever terrorist attack. Nisman’s case against Fernández de Kirchner and Timerman was dismissed on February 2, but it dealt a heavy blow to the government’s credibility and authority.

Adding to the twilight atmosphere is a seriously beleagured economy. Some pessimists are even predicting collapse, a forecast born of creeping inflation, slow to non-existent growth, a serious dependence on commodities markets, and a deeply destructive default.

Detractors of Fernández de Kirchner, and Kirchnerism, want Argentina to save itself from true disaster with a return to capital markets, even becoming a major regional economic power again if the right economic policies are implemented and sustained. Such accommodation with global neoliberalism would mark the true end of the Kirchnerist project.

A lasting legacy

Latin American politics expert Steven Levitsky argued that we might in fact be facing “the end of the left in Latin America”. The commodity boom has all but ended, and many of the leftist movements that rode it to power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are running out of steam after too many years in power.

But what this analysis misses is the depth of the left’s legacy – a plethora of policies for social inclusion, citizenship and rights that has left a deep imprint on the continent. Kirchner-era Argentina, for its part, has taken bold steps to widen its social safety net and citizenship rights. Targeted cash transfer programmes, which were initially short-term, were extended by the plan Argentina Trabaja, supporting co-operative enterprises in poor neighbourhoods.

On to the next one.
Reuters/Marcos Brindicci

Cristina’s government also introduced a targeted programme for children, the Universal Child Benefit (Asignación Universal por Hijo or AUH). It’s not the country’s first child benefit scheme, but it covers the population on an unprecedented scale. The AUH provides around 200 Argentine pesos (US$50) a month to nearly 4m children and families, and 80% of Argentina’s children now receive some form of child benefit.

For the first time, the government is extending welfare programmes directly to children and to workers who are not unionised. In fact, most beneficiaries will be self-employed or in the informal economy – groups that were particularly active in the protests of 2001.

The Fernández de Kirchner government also introduced a “reasonable” minimum wage for non-unionised workers (including domestic workers) in 2008, and has put pressure on private health companies to extend their coverage and reduce their charges. An anti-poverty strategy has brought poverty down to around 25% from more than 50% in the wake the 2001-02 economic crisis.

In this scenario, it is not surprising that the poor voters who have benefited from state largesse over the past eight years remain loyal to the Kirchnerist project. This explains why Scioli is riding high, for now at least. His ascendance is a sign that despite all the problems they and their country have faced, the Kirchners have managed to construct a legacy of inclusion and social rights that may yet endure.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

What Is Going on in Argentina with President Fernandez de Kirchner?

By Pia Riggirozzi. Pia Riggirozzi is Associate Professor in Global Politics at University of Southampton (@PRiggirozziAcademia.edu). You can find more posts by Pia here.


[Cross-posted at The Conversation.]

Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, has announced plans to dissolve her country’s intelligence services. President Fernandez de Kirchner’s move comes after the controversial death of a prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, who had accused her of attempting to cover up Iran’s role in the country’s deadliest ever terrorist attack: the bombing of the AMIA (the Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Society) in Buenos Aires in 1994, which killed 85 people.

How did things get to this point, and how did Fernandez de Kirchner get into such terrible legal turmoil?

Cristina de Kirchner and Héctor Timerman. EPA/Jason Szenes

Muddy waters

Nisman had allegedly been investigating the AMIA bombing for over a decade. He finally brought things to a head in mid-January 2015, when he suddenly brought an indictment against Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and her foreign minister, Héctor Timerman, for their suspected involvement in the cover-up.

Nisman was then found dead in his apartment on January 18 2015, just four days after serving the indictment and hours before a judicial inquiry was set to begin. His death was declared “suspicious” despite the fact that it seemed like a suicide – and the investigation into it has now turned up evidence he may have been planning to arrest Fernandez de Kirchner herself.

Nisman’s allegations about the Iranian connection must be seen in a wider context. There has been a marked shift in Argentina’s policy towards Iran since 2010, mainly led by Timerman, towards trade and diplomatic relations.

At the same time, Iran has been trying to raise its profile in Latin America in general as it looks for ways to ease the pain of Western sanctions. Tehran has forged close ties with leftist governments in Venezuela and Bolivia, and has been seeking trade agreements with Brazil for food imports.

While the shift to Iran, and the lack of judicial progress in the case of international terrorism striking the country still needs to be accounted for, the death of Nisman and the ensuing political chaos has raised profound concerns about the state of Argentina’s democracy.

Alberto Nisman. EPA/Cezaro de Luca

Nisman’s case against Fernandez de Kirchner and Timerman was dismissed on February 2. It relied heavily on transcripts of wiretapped conversations between Argentine negotiators and Iranian officials, and these recorded conversations – provided by the intelligence services – were found to be inconclusive and the case lacking in substantive evidence.

There are suspicions about whether this evidence was all it seemed, and worries that the intelligence service was up to its old tricks once again – muddying the waters of a highly sensitive case, or even supporting sinister plans to destabilise the government.

But those misgivings themselves show that whatever Fernandez de Kirchner’s real reason for doing it, the intelligence overhaul was undeniably long overdue.

Toxic institutions

During Argentina’s so-called Dirty War in the 1970s and 80s, the intelligence services were dominated by the military, and acted as its instrument in the persecution of opposition leaders and social activists.

After democratisation began in 1983, the government of Raul Alfonsin was mainly focused on reforming two main enforcing agencies: the armed forces and the police. The intelligence services were left for later, despite the fact the secret services were still rampantly active, engaging in political disappearances and the extortion of prominent businessmen to “make up” for the dwindling demand for their services.

In part, this was just one of many difficulties facing a fledgling democracy that was struggling to achieve stability and self-confidence. But the intelligence services were also protected by the fact that even democratic governments found them very politically useful.

Taken at face value, then, Fernandez de Kirchner has done the right thing. Dismantling the intelligence services was necessary, a debt of democratisation in Argentina. And while passing the reform will require parliamentary endorsement, Kirchner’s Front for Victory party controls 39 of the 72 seats in the Senate and 130 of the 257 seats in the lower house, the changes will probably enjoy a smooth ride through both chambers.

But whether Fernandez de Kirchner’s newfound zeal for reform will do anything for the health of Argentina’s democracy is another question entirely.

For democracy’s sake

Instead of opening up engagement with the opposition, Fernandez de Kirchner’s swift intervention has become a piece of partisan grandstanding, and has all but trivialised the judicial process Nisman began.

It has also done nothing to dismiss suspicions about the president’s “real reasons” for dismantling the intelligence service, while sending party politics into a frenzied back-and-forth of accusations and denunciation.

The government stands accused of using Nisman’s case for partisan ends, dodging a major investigation into the president in an election year; it in turn accuses the opposition of not wanting to give up illicit paid access to political information from spooks.

Of course, weak institutions and impunity for the powerful are not the fruits of some latter-day Kirchnerista invention; they are long-established facts of Argentine political life. Still, the current government has done a lot to deepen distrust of the state among its people.

To be sure, the sensation around the death of Nisman made it clear just how badly Argentina’s intelligence system needed reform, and created the context to finally get the job done. But for the sake of democracy, this must not be allowed to descend into a party-political brawl – and certainly not at such a sensitive time, as a two-term-limited president nears the end of her tenure.

Reexamining the 2001 Argentine crisis and its aftermath

DipticBy Dr. Ana Margheritis, Reader in International Relations at University of Southampton (Twitter, Academia.edu). You can find more posts by Ana here.


Ten days ago, the launching of a recently published book entitled Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future at the Institute of the Americas (University College of London) was a good opportunity to revisit the vicissitudes of contemporary politics in Argentina. The volume, edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde, gathers the contributions of a multidisciplinary international group of scholars to the analysis of the legacies of the 2001 crisis. In particular, the book explores the responses to the crisis in various dimensions: economic processes, domestic politics, social mobilization, and cultural practices. As invited discussant, I noted several contributions this book is making to our understanding of the implications of such dramatic events. Among other things, I highlighted the following points and encouraged further discussion and investigation.

Ana_IMG_3274I welcomed the introduction of the concept of “crisis intermezzo.” It might be a very helpful analytical concept in the Argentine case and probably other cases too. While transition is defined as “a process during which the previous act is terminated and replaced by a different one, (…) intermezzo is a bracketed act between two acts of the same piece” (p. 144). This conceptual contrast may broaden our historical perspective of what happened in Argentina. In the light of recent developments, it is evident that Argentines have started to anticipate, once again, a new crisis as if they have developed, through recurrent crises, a particular ability to do so and the aftermath of the crisis was just an intermezzo to catch their breath.

A number of things happened during the intermezzo, though. Several chapters in this volume give us tools to analyze both rebellion from below and reconstruction from above. The contributors ably illustrate how citizens mobilized driven by anger and hope, and how the state de-mobilize them and used the opportunity to give the Kirchners’ model its identity, narrative, and historical projection. I note that integrating the two process seems to be a pending task. Doing so might require exploring how crises and intermezzos have become naturalised throughout their cyclical recurrence and how Argentine politics (and Peronist politics in particular) have become the art of managing crisis or using intermezzos to re-invent the (now) dominant party.

With respect to the top-down part of that process, I note that there is an underlying theme in the book: the recasting of state power as post-neoliberalism promised to bring the state back in and mend the damage made by neoliberal policies. In my view, the return of the state seems to be an unfinished, inconsistent, and uneven process across geographies of the national territory and across policy areas; it has also been closely intertwined with the government’s significant efforts to re-write a narrative of the past, present and future of the country (and the role of the Kirchner family in it). This recurrent theme made me think that an emphasis on responses to the crisis might be insufficient. Most chapters, indeed, identify contradictions and tensions between national popular discourses and the policies and politics of dispossession. This suggests the need to elaborate not only on the responses but also on the non-responses, the issues that have been silenced, the mobilization that was de-mobilized, the dissent that was diluted or simply postponed. Doing so might help make sense of the paradox that the protesters’ slogan “que se vayan todos!” (they all must go!) faded in front of politicians’ resilience and resistance to leave and to implement necessary political reforms. Old and new factions continue struggling today as the time of election approaches, while popular discontent persists and focuses on recurrent problems (e.g., corruption, insecurity, inflation) and the component of hope contained in the 2001 protests has not been fulfilled yet.

How Argentina’s Government Has Drawn New Energy from the Vulture Fund Crisis

By Pia Riggirozzi, Senior Lecturer in Global Politics at University of Southampton (@PRiggirozziAcademia.edu). You can find more posts by Pia here.


Sovereign debt, crises and default have been regular features of the Argentine economy for years – but the latest debt crisis, involving the government and the so-called “vulture funds”, has thrown up new questions about the state’s capacity versus the ethics of capitalism.

Vulture funds are private creditors who deliberately took up cut-price Argentine bonds after the 2002 collapse, then refused to renegotiate their terms in 2005 and 2010 when the country entered a process of debt restructuring – all with the aim of eventually litigating against default and reaping exorbitant profits.

Accordingly, these creditors had been demanding the full value of the debt on which they had originally speculated. At the end of July this year, in the latest twist in its fiscal saga, Argentina was declared to be in default for the second time in 12 years.

Defaults are always economically damaging and politically destabilising, particularly in a context of inflation and growing political and social malaise. But the irony this year is that, unlike December 2001, today’s markets seem relatively untroubled by the event – and that rather than putting the government on the ropes, the current financial crisis is apparently shoring up the dominance of the Kirchnerist project.

imagesThe bad old days

The background to all this is Argentina’s financial crisis of 2001-2002, precipitated by what was then the biggest sovereign debt default in history.

Argentina was at a critical juncture; its public debt as a percentage of GDP reached 166%, the nation was facing abrupt pauperisation, road blocks, and factory takeovers; its leaders were struggling to preserve social cohesion. Two months after Argentina defaulted, the value of the peso dropped by more than a third.

Cross-class demands for more inclusive and responsive democracy screamed “¡Que se vayan todos!” (“Out with all of them”), expressing the enormous gap that had opened up between government and society.

As the country’s whole political economic order collapsed, presidents came and went in quick succession – until a temporary parliament-led government under the Peronist former leader of Congress, Eduardo Duhalde, assumed some degree of institutional command. That administration eventually gave way to the elected government of Nestor Kirchner in May 2003.

Fixing it up

The challenges facing the new government were huge. A judicious devaluation of the peso in January 2002, however, led to a considerable expansion of exports, especially agro/industrial ones, greatly boosting state revenues. Systematic renegotiations of the terms of privatised companies and nationalisations followed suit. Negotiations also began with creditors of 152 different bonds series, issued under several jurisdictions.

In 2005 and 2010, a deal brought the country’s default to a successful close, with 93% of creditors accepting new bonds worth 30 cents on the dollar. The remaining 7% of “hold-out” creditors rejected the offer, demanding payment in full. The government also sought independence from the IMF, cancelling off the debt and creating an image of a sovereign state, with greater room for manoeuvre than was possible in the previous decades.

A more confident and better-resourced government was often accompanied by controversial forms of social and political incorporation. Like Menem in the 1990s, the administrations of Nestor Kirchner, followed by Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, concentrated heavily on reinforcing executive authority, took timely yet bold initiatives and advanced controversial forms of government interventionism.

This strategy paid off by doing something to alleviate widespread poverty, inequality and exclusion. But whatever the social gains, the cost has been economic stress, distributional pressures and badly weakened political institutions.

Betting the farm

The political strength of the government has been tested to the extreme by two main forces: farmers and vulture funds.

In 2008, during a state decision to increase agro-export taxes to reflect fluctuating commodity prices, landowners and farm-based groups organised lock-outs, road blocks and the destruction of crops bound for market, until the export tax was settled.

To this day, conservative and reactionary rural factions play a massive and direct role in shaping policy, even while supporting the political opposition. In a flailing economy that has failed to diversify its industrial base and is highly dependent on the primary sector, this is not a minor concern.

Argentina is now stuck with recession, high inflation and, over the past year, the pressure of an unstable peso and the black market for dollars. All this, combined with the gloomy global environment, leaves the country increasingly dependent on foreign capital to maintain growth, employment and price stability.

Under pressure

Factions outside the government have increasingly joined forces in the renewed legal battle being waged on behalf of the vulture funds – and litigation from hold-out creditors, which has persisted for more than a decade, now carries the weight of the US Supreme Court, which in July upheld a decision ruling that Argentina is legally obliged to repay its American hold-out creditors in full.

This took a Kafkaesque turn when the Argentine government deposited the bondholders’ payment into US-based financial intermediaries, only to be blocked by US district judge, Thomas Griesa, alleging that payments could not be processed at all unless settled directly with the vulture funds. As a result, Argentina defaulted.

Legally, Judge Griesa’s sentence is widely believed to be impracticable: agreement with vultures means last-to-come-in creditors get the best deal, which would send Argentina into an economic tailspin based on an contorted interpretation of the legal principle of pari passu.pdf) (equal treatment of creditors).

So, full payment: politically unlikely and economically impossible. The government will need to weigh Argentine laws and citizens versus US laws and investors – a fiendish balancing act for a government that has invested all its political capital in opposing the vultures at all costs.

Paradox

The case against the vulture funds has had a huge impact on the economic agenda not just in Argentina, but also internationally: in early September, the United Nations General Assembly began work to establish a new international convention regulating the restructuring of sovereign debt.

Meanwhile, the political fallout of the crisis at home has paradoxically been largely to the benefit of term-limited president Cristina Kirchner, reasserting her centrality in politics just as she was losing her clout in the run-up to the 2015 elections.

The struggle against the hold-out creditors is being played out electorally through social mobilisation. This is just what happened in the 2008 conflict with the farmers; Cristina Kirchner’s strategy was to appeal to the urban working class. She pointed out farmers’ relative prosperity and stoked fears that popular social programmes would have to be eliminated if they got their way – even publicly calling them “greedy” and “coup-plotters”.

The Kirchner administration is now once again back on its old mettle, appealing to citizens with the slogan “Patria o Buitres” (“homeland or vultures”), a binary definition that suits her barnstorming rhetoric and mocks casino capitalism and those who support it. Her political opposition is back on the defensive – and her government perhaps reinvigorated – even as she grapples with the thorniest crisis of her tenure.