What Just Happened? Thoughts on the election

By Hal Wolman. Hal Wolman was the founding Director of the George Washington Institute of Public Policy (GWIPP) and served in that capacity from 2000-2012. He is an emeritus professor in the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and a Research Professor in the George Washington Institute of Public Policy. Dr. Wolman is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration.


Donald Trump won.

The election was very, very close.  The switch of a relatively few votes (less than 1% in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) would have given the election to Clinton.  If that had happened there would have been a quite different narrative.  This was not a massive shift in voting behavior, but a shift on the margins.  That said, see first sentence above.

Indeed, Hillary Clinton won the popular vote.  But the correct response to that – besides saying that the Electoral College is an archaic institution – is, so what?  The election was fought under Electoral College rules, rules that both sides understood and which structured their behavior.  Had it been under the rules of a national popular vote, both candidates and their campaigns would have behaved much differently.  In particular, they would have spent a lot more of their time and resources in California, New York, and Texas, all essentially one-party very populous states which were non-competitive in electoral college terms and which were therefore largely ignored (except for fund raising).  In a national popular election one vote anywhere is as good as a vote anywhere else and the concept of “losing” a state would be meaningless.  Losing California by 1,000,000 votes rather than 1,000 has the same result in the Electoral College.  But it means you pick up 999,000 additional votes in a national popular vote election.  That means candidates would campaign where the most votes are.  And, under those circumstances it’s unclear who would have won.

So why did she lose?  Was it James Comey’s letter two weeks before the election?  Yes.  Was it Wikileaks constant drip of stolen emails?  Yes.  Was it third parties, particularly Jill Stein, but also Gary Johnson?  Yes.  Was it because she was just a bad candidate?  Yes.  Was it poor campaign strategy?  Yes.  Yes to all of these, because when an election is so close, anything that might have slightly pushed it in the direction of Trump could have made the difference.  But, the real culprit was…

Turnout.  Particularly among African-Americans, which was down substantially from 2008 and 2012 when Obama was running.  That’s not terribly surprising – high African-American turnout when the first African-American was running for President.  What’s surprising is that so called experts didn’t see African-American turnout dropping from these levels in 2016.  I suspect that, to the extent the polls got it wrong – and in the end the national polls didn’t get it very wrong – it was because they mis-estimated turnout among Democratic oriented groups.  (There is also some evidence that there were some people who said, out of concern that they would be harshly judged, that they intended to vote for Clinton when they really intended to vote for Trump.  Apparently a couple of polling firms conducted some telephone polls with a live interviewer and some through an automatic robotic type phone poll.  The latter consistently showed slightly more support for Trump, particularly among women.)  In addition the exit polls indicate that a slightly lower percentage of African-American who did go to the polls voted for Clinton than voted for Obama in 2012 and 2008 (again, not surprisingly).

Latino turnout did increase, but not as much as had been predicted.  And despite Trump’s focus on immigration, Mexican criminals, etc., Trump actually got a higher share of the Latino vote than did Romney in 2012!  Who knows why this happened?  (Although these exit poll results are contested.  See here.)

What about women?  Did the fact that the first woman ever to run for President help or hurt Hillary?  Don’t know, at least not yet.  There clearly was a shift of college-educated women from Republican to Democratic voting in 2016, which, since more educated women are likely to be more concerned with feminism (I think), is consistent with some advantage for Hillary as a result of her gender.  But it could also just as easily result from more highly-educated women being put off by the boorishness and grossness of Donald Trump.  Maybe some of each.

The clearest shift in voting behavior – and the one most commented on – is the shift among traditional working class Democrats, particularly in the industrial Midwestern and Middle-Atlantic states (Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Pennsylvania) from support of a Democratic candidate to support for Trump.  This has sometimes been portrayed as a rural vote, but it was clearly much more than that.  There simply aren’t enough people living in rural areas to make that much of a difference.  Instead it was people in smaller cities – think Scranton or Erie, PA, Akron and Youngstown, Ohio, Saginaw, Michigan, etc. – who were the switchers that mattered, and will matter in the future if the switch was permanent and not just one-off.

Why did this shift occur?  Given the tenor of the campaign, some have attributed it to racism.  Certainly the Trump campaign made it OK for racists and expressions of racism to be more publicly acceptable than they have been for a long time.  Nonetheless, I am not persuaded that racism was the main reason.  Remember, switch means that these are people who voted for an African-American for President in 2012 and 2008.  If they were willing to vote for an actual African-American then, why would racism explain a switch to Trump in 2016?  Maybe these are simply people to whom Trump had a special appeal in terms of a strong Macho (potentially authoritarian) candidate, much more so than a Romney or McCain did.  Working class authoritarianism is a well-documented phenomenon in the social sciences.

Maybe, as some have commented, it was a matter of working class whites as a group, a group experiencing the disappearance of traditional manufacturing jobs, higher rates of unemployment, and lower incomes, feeling left behind, disrespected, and their problems and issues ignored.  To get a sense of this, let’s take seriously the idea of trying to imagine – as we are frequently and rightfully told to do – what it’s like to be an African-American or a LGBT person, but this time let’s put  ourselves in the shoes of the white working class.  Is it possible that they might simply feel that “nobody – certainly not the political and economic elites – cares about me.”  They care about various minority groups, they care about gays, about immigrants, refugees, etc., but I’ve got problems too, and nobody seems to care.  I have no “identity” in a party that is characterized by identity group coalition politics (a coalition of victims as somebody has called it). They might even feel this way without being racist or homophobic (though some of them are certainly that as well).  Example: how does this sound to a member of the white working class?  The Black Lives Matter people say “Black Lives Matter.”  Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton and others respond at first by agreeing but then saying, “All Lives Matter.” They are shouted down until they toe the line and say simply “Black Lives Matter.”  Now, I know what the Black Lives Matter people were trying to do and what their concern was.  But think of how this sounds to white working class people, most of whom are not steeped in the history of white privilege or in the understanding of Black social movements.  It sounds pretty much like they are saying “people like me and our lives don’t matter.”  Not good.

What’s the effect going to be of a Trump presidency?  There goes the Supreme Court for a generation unless Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kennedy all manage to hang on for at least four more years.  In terms of policy, who knows?  I don’t believe Trump really has any true policy preferences.  The path of least resistance for him is to simply say, “I ran as a Republican, Paul Ryan is a Republican, he seems to have some strong feelings about policy, I guess I’ll run with that unless someone gives me a reason not to.   That wouldn’t be good, but in many ways it wouldn’t be awful.  As a country we’ve had Presidents with Paul Ryan type thinking before (e.g., Reagan) and we’ve survived it.  On the other hand, he may follow his own idiosyncratic path, which would mean in many cases war with Republicans in Congress as well as Democrats.  The real worry for everybody is in the foreign and military areas.  What’s he going to do when he finds out that Putin isn’t all that nice a guy after all and has insulted him by sending men in plain green uniforms into, say, Lithuania?  Threaten to drop a bomb on Moscow?  Actually drop a bomb on Moscow?  God save us all.

The Left After Trump

Diptic

Diptic

By Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker. Will Jennings is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of Southampton (Twitter) and Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton (Twitter). You can read more posts by Will Jennings here and more posts by Gerry Stoker here.


Trump’s election is an unmistakable rejection of a political establishment and an economic system that simply isn’t working for most people. It is one that has delivered escalating inequality and stagnating or falling living standards for the majority, both in the US and Britain.

This is a rejection of a failed economic consensus and a governing elite that has been seen not to have listened. And the public anger that has propelled Donald Trump to office has been reflected in political upheavals across the world.

But some of Trump’s answers to the big questions facing America, and the divisive rhetoric around them, are clearly wrong.

I have no doubt, however, that the decency and common sense of the American people will prevail, and we send our solidarity to a nation of migrants, innovators and democrats.

After this latest global wake up call, the need for a real alternative to a failed economic and political system could not be clearer.

That alternative must be based on working together, social justice and economic renewal, rather than sowing fear and division. And the solutions we offer have to improve the lives of everyone, not pit one group of people against another.

Americans have made their choice. The urgent necessity is now for us all to work across continents to tackle our common global challenges: to secure peace, take action on climate change and deliver economic prosperity and justice.

This was the statement made by Jeremy Corbyn, the Leader of Britain’s Labour Party, in response to the Trump victory in the American presidential election. If progressives are to respond to Trump’s victory, Brexit and the rise of right-wing populism across Europe and other democracies including Australia and parts of Asia the leader of one of Europe’s most successful and long-established social democratic parties might reasonably be expected to be on the right track. Unfortunately he is not. Corbyn falls down both in his diagnosis of what is happening and in the wooliness of his solutions.

Misunderstanding the problem

In terms of diagnosis the issue is that neither Trump nor Brexit – let alone other versions of right-wing populism – have built their electoral coalitions based on those left behind by economic change alone. They mobilise a bloc of disaffected working class voters and combine them with conservative supporters of from better-off households. Brexit won the day by combining traditional rural and suburban Conservative voters with more disaffected working class support in urban areas that have experienced economic decline over many decades. Trump won because he managed to peel away enough working class white voters while retaining the middle-class and rural Republican base. A classic pattern of support for right-wing populism follows the shape of a V-curve with most support coming from either end of the political spectrum: the relatively deprived and the relatively well-off.

Most of these voters do not reject the current economic system. Rather they want to be better placed within it. It is long-term employment and wage stagnation that is driving this economic discontent. Beyond that economic discontent how does right-wing populism pull together the two sides of its coalition? It gives people someone or something to blame for that sense of losing out. Populism relies to a great degree on the capacity of leaders to manipulate exasperation with social change, for example ‘by portraying “ordinary people” as the victim of an alliance between those at the bottom (needy immigrants and asylum seekers) and those at the top (the wealthy elite who aspire to even greater wealth and political clout)’. It adds issues of social identity, status and antagonism to the mix to create a distinctive politics of resentment.

There are three lessons to draw from this alternative diagnosis; none of which are central to Corbyn’s analysis. First there is no “unmistakable rejection” of the current economic system; although there anything that can be defined as the political establishment is given a kicking. Second unlocking the V-curve of support for right-wing populism is not a straightforward task because it mixes economic and social resentments. Arguing that we need an economy that works for all will be treated as the vacuous statement it is. In any case it will not cut through the wider sense of resentment against others. In politics there is no real or imagined nature to resentment there is just resentments and whether progressives like it or not they have to be addressed. Third, the only future for building an alternative winning electoral bloc is not simply to appeal to the left behind but to build a wide coalition of support drawn from those who are both winners and relatively speaking  losers from a complex dynamic of economic change. In short do not believe the rhetoric of right wing populists about standing for the left behind. Look at what they do to win.

Coming up with solutions

Here the challenge faced by progressives is that modern global capitalism is – as ever– creating a dynamic of winners and losers. Cosmopolitan centres are the gainers in a new system of global production, manufacturing, distribution and consumption that has led to new urban forms made possible by the revolution in logistics and new technologies. These centres are marked by their intellectual assets, cultural strength and the capacity of their infrastructure to attract people, ideas and skills. These global urban centres are highly connected, highly innovative, well-networked, attracting skilled populations, often supported by inward migration, and display the qualities of cosmopolitan urbanism. Such places will be further advantaged by trends of robotisation and automation in the labour force, and a shift towards service and knowledge economies. At the same time, other towns, cities and regions are experiencing an outflow of capital and human resources, and are suffering from a lack of entrepreneurship, low levels of innovation, cultural nostalgia and disconnectedness from the values of the metropolitan elite. These shrinking urban locations are the other side of the coin; for them the story is of being left behind as old industries die or as old roles become obsolete, human and physical infrastructure decays. Populations may be declining, the skilled workers and the young are leaving in search of opportunity (reinforcing the cycle of decline) and these places are increasingly disconnected from the dynamic sectors of the economy, as well as the social liberalism of hyper-modern global cities in which the political, economic and media classes plough their furrow.

These developments are not temporary or transitional. The scale of change is such that the processes that are in operation go beyond cyclical explanations of growth and decline, since the entire system of production, distribution and consumption is being restructured, generating new divides that have an air of solidity. The situation is such that the position of cosmopolitan cities is self-reinforcing but not without challenges. While not all left behind cities, towns and rural areas can easily be dragged into the slipstream of dynamics of the creative economy by policy interventions.

We are only in the foothills of being able to grapple with the policy issues created by this dynamic of social and economic change. It would be better for progressives to accept that they are far from clear about what to do rather than mouth platitudes about social justice or argue that more investment in infrastructure, housing, education and training will do the trick. Some of these types of interventions have been tried yet they appear to only partially stem the tide of change. To argue for more of such interventions without reflecting on what should be done appears misguided. A display of humility from politicians and experts around the political establishment might encourage voters to listen to them again.

We need action both locally and globally. The importance of a local focus and a commitment to local power is that the right solutions for different areas are likely not to be the same. For cosmopolitan areas of growth the challenges are congestion, housing shortages and sustaining a wider social fabric as the pace of work accelerates. For those areas they can join the new economy as latecomers then a clear specification of the niche and focus of their ambition as well as targeted financial incentives, infrastructure and training would be required. We may also have to accept that some areas will be forever left behind and develop a planning system capable of managing decline and embracing the potential of declining growth in terms of climate and lifestyle gains. Globally the challenge is how to sustain free trade while tackling its social and environmental impacts. This probably means revisiting the global architecture of regulation set up after the Second World War. There is no quick fix and it is important for progressives to be honest about that.

The final reason why progressives need to work hard on solutions in that those offered by right-wing populists will fail. Controlling immigration will not solve the problems of left behind places such as Rotherham, Yorkshire or Flint, Michigan. Leaving the EU will not save the NHS for Britain. Imagining a global economy where you trade freely and yet you impose barriers on others or where you can access markets without following rules agreed by all others does not make it a reality. The fallout from those failures will be massive but progressives should not assume they will be the automatic beneficiaries. Populists will be good at the blame game. The challenge for progressives is both to offer an accurate diagnosis of what is going on and work in depth on solutions to respond. Corybn’s statement should be a cause of concern, rather than hope.

The Failures of Political Science: Trump, Brexit and beyond…

By Will Jennings and Martin Lodge. Will Jennings is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of Southampton (Twitter) and Martin Lodge is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science (Lse.ac.ukTwitter). You can read more posts by Will Jennings here.


Donald Trump is president-elect of the United States of America, while in June Britain voted to leave the EU. Political science has widely failed to anticipate two of the defining events of our era, just as it failed to foresee the fall of the Berlin Wall thirty years ago (also on November 9th). Populism is everywhere now and has entered the mainstream. Few could dispute that political science has been somewhat blindsided, having been distracted by the scientific credentials of the discipline, and having itself become an elite technocratic enterprise detached from the everyday experiences and everyday politics of voters.

Donald Trump broke all the rules of the political science textbook of election campaigning. He lied. He did not release his tax returns. He insulted significant parts of the electorate. He attacked the media. He brazenly rode out scandal after scandal. He was not backed by party elites. He did not pivot. He was not endorsed by newspapers. He was not considered qualified for the job by voters. He faced a relatively popular incumbent and growing economy. The polls and poll aggregators predicted a comfortable Clinton win (many academic forecasts were rather more circumspect). Trump defied them all. A not dissimilar story could be told about the Brexit campaign. While some could rightly claim to have diagnosed the conditions leading to each victory, these were surprise events when they happened.

Our analysis did not stand up to the job, and this poses fundamental questions about the direction that the discipline has taken in recent decades and its abandonment of a more critical examination of the nature of politics. Political science has lately glorified big data, replication and high-tech computational methods. But what use are these if hegemonic theories and fashionable methods are ill-equipped for the task at hand?

At the same time, the role of the academic as pundit has increasingly pitched political scientists into the media limelight. While advancing public understanding of politics should unquestionably be a mission for the discipline, this creates pressure to hype findings, condense them into the confines of a tweet, or offer analysis to meet the demands of short-term news cycles rather than posing more critical questions about the nature of social and political change (or questioning the assumptions of our data and models), or even challenge the way in which politics is done and the media package it. This pressures researchers to favour punditry (making bold predictions about outcomes and basking in applause for their foresight) above deeper diagnosis of long-term trends. It also often makes them inseparable from the politics they seek to analyse.

Of course, political science has had much to say about the rise of populism across many advanced democracies, its causes and its consequences. We know a substantial amount about the nature of the U.S. political system and its (lack of) responsiveness to wider societal change, the rise of Euroscepticism, the increasing importance of values and identity in various political contexts, and the notion of ‘backsliding’ by countries on earlier commitments to liberal democracy. Beyond this, there is further scope for soul-searching. This should centre on the role of political science in a context in which it has become acceptable to endorse the rise of ‘illiberal democracies’.

One of these is the nature of knowledge production. Universities in their quest for global reputations have become ghettos for research communities whose international interactions are rarely interrupted by the inconvenient demands imposed by high fee-paying students (and have engaged little with local people living in communities on their peripheries). These networks are reinforced by advances in communication technologies – generating our very own academic filter bubbles. The move towards bifurcating academic careers into research and teaching silos will only increase this disconnection outside the discipline. This is not a context that is able to detect or fully understand societal changes.

Such trends have been further accentuated by the craze to create ‘public policy schools’ so as to inform global elites of students about policy experiences, global challenges and international networking. Such programmes have been attractive in financial terms to universities, they have proven to be a convenient vehicle to attract high profile donors, and they offer opportunities for students to mingle. Interestingly, the fashion of public policy schools arrived just as the attractions of private sector MBAs seem to be fading away. To be close to ‘practice’, the academic gain is access to the questions and concerns of key decision-makers who have a desire to learn about ‘what works’ without necessarily probing deeply into scholarly disputes. More broadly, critical questioning is unlikely to feature on such programmes given that learning outcomes are about enhancing ‘rationality’.

Executive-type teaching offers higher rewards and the possibility to avoid routine, intensive teaching duties. The quest for global leadership in the name of rational decision-making is likely to come at the price of dealing with concrete problems at the local level (losing the tacit knowledge that is crucial to understanding the challenges facing local societies and communities). These programmes, by their nature, are unable to cope with an environment that encourages post-factual argumentation.

More generally, this raises questions about the role of political science. For those believing in a pure version of ‘science’, the political science discipline is about ‘knowledge’ with little concern for the wider environment. This ignores a much more significant contribution that political science should play in promoting the normative foundations of liberal democracy. This is not to discourage critical analysis and commentary, but a renewed focus on the prerequisites for an open and tolerant society to conduct politics. This would require a much deeper engagement with society beyond one-off events such as open day events and school visits. This requires encouragement for universities to become part of the wider conversation about the importance of certain constitutional and democratic norms.

In other words, political science, if it wants to live in a liberal democracy and be in a position to work openly and freely, needs to return to a concern with protecting the very foundations of liberal democracy. Whether the short term career incentives of academics and the wider environment of populist politics and campaigning media will be receptive to this necessity is questionable. However, the question of what kind of societies political scientists want to inhabit is of fundamental importance: do they want to live in cut-off ghettos of the like-minded, obsessed by sectarian ‘top three’ journal rankings, or do they want to promote and support the conditions for an open society, one that makes science possible in the first place?

Yesterday we woke to the news that the United States of America has chosen a new president: Donald Trump.

By Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton (Academia.eduGoogle Scholar). You can read more posts by Jonathan here.


What happened?

As was the case with the 2015 UK General Election and the Brexit Referendum many of the pollsters and pundits were wrong in their projections that Hillary Clinton would win the U.S. Presidency. I include myself in that camp, so there is no gloating from me over the outcome.

All I will say is that the rise of polling aggregation websites such as fivethirtyeight.com has created a bit of over confidence in the general public (and political junkies in particular) about how predictive polls can be. I am not an expert in survey research methods, but all of my professional colleagues who are tend to be far more cautious about making predictions as they are well aware that polls, and even aggregates of polls can go wrong.

Figuring out exactly how Donald Trump pulled off this upset is a bit simpler. Looking at where he did well at the state and county level in the U.S. shows that he overwhelmingly won white, noncollege educated voters in places such as the upper Midwest (states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin). While these voters have been trending towards the Republican Party for some time, Obama was able to keep enough of them in his electoral coalition to win twice. Enough of them broke for Donald Trump in key swing states that he was able to carve out an electoral college win.

What does this mean?

As has been the case since Donald Trump announced his candidacy, conventional political wisdom has often been wrong. Despite significant cynicism among voters, politicians do often at least try to keep their major campaign promises. In Trump’s case, despite his often overthetop rhetoric, he has been remarkably consistent about what he wanted to if he won the election. Let’s review his core promises.

“Build a wall and get Mexico to pay for it”

It is still difficult for me to imagine how Trump will persuade Mexico to pay for his proposed border wall (short of potentially threatening Mexico with the United States’ military might), but I do believe that it is likely that one of his first goals will be to ask Congress to fund the construction of a wall.

Implicit in this promise was also a plan to for stricter immigration. While he did waffle throughout the campaign about what exactly this would mean, at different points he did promise to prevent all Muslims from entering the U.S., and engage in mass deportations of the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Again campaign rhetoric will quickly run into questions of cost and feasibility, but there is no doubt that Trump and the Republican Party will take his win as a mandate to crackdown on both legal and illegal immigration.

Trade Protectionism

The region where Trump pulled off his upset is often referred to as the “Rustbelt”. It is the part of the U.S. that has experienced the most significant deindustrialization over the last 40 years. Many members of the working class in these regions have lost their high-paying unionised jobs in steel factories and car plants as companies have moved their manufacturing facilities to other countries with lower wages.

Trump has promised to tear up unpopular trade deals such as NAFTA (a trade deal often closely associated with the Clintons) and get better deals. Again, what such better deals entail was never fully spelled out. But a Trump Presidency coming on the heels of a Brexit vote clearly signals that the era of free trade and low tariffs is nearing an end. From a UK perspective, suddenly needing potential trade partners, the timing of the rise of protectionism in the U.S. could not be worse.

Skepticism towards NATO and Military Alliances

While Trump promised to “defeat ISIS”, again his campaign never offered any coherent explanation of how they would do this. Aside from escalating the war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, most of Trumps other foreign policy promises were decidedly isolationist.

He frequently signaled that he would seek détente with Russian President Vladimir Putin; and he indicated at several points a desire to rework the NATO alliance, going so far as in one interview to claim that he might not come to the aid of a NATO ally that was being attacked.

This is dangerous for a few reasons. First NATO, and other collective security arrangements, rely on the premise that “an attack against one member state is an attack on all member states”. This is intended to create a credible commitment between all members that will deter potential adversaries from invading any country. If the most powerful member in the alliance (the U.S.) signals that it no longer would be willing to come to the defence of a European ally, members of the alliance could be left defenseless against rival states.

As Russia has already invaded and annexed a portion of the Crimea, many states in Eastern Europe are concerned that a breakdown of NATO could leave them vulnerable to a Russian invasion. Secondly, if Trump does begin to withdraw the U.S. from its international alliances in both Europe and the Asia Pacific, it is not clear who or what fills the void. Does this election signal the end of U.S. hegemony in military affairs, and the rise of some new multipolar regime where every state (including the UK) must go it on its own?

Possible Attacks on the Rule of Law

One of the reasons this campaign was so nasty was because of the personal nature of Donald Trump’s attacks on his political opponents. At different times during the campaign he attacked the independence of judges (threatening one judge who was overseeing a lawsuit against him) and threatening to rewrite U.S. libel laws to make it easier for him and other public figures to sue media outlets for negative coverage.

Most jarring of all was his threat to lock up Hillary Clinton if she lost. The controversy over the handling of State Department emails has dogged her during the course of the Presidential campaign, yet despite several investigations, no one has been able to produce evidence that Clinton has committed a crime. Yet central to Trump’s closing argument during the campaign was a promise the “drain the swamp”.

Trump and the Republicans today find themselves in control of both Houses of Congress, and in a position to swing the balance of power on the Supreme Court to a conservative majority. Americans are fond of praising their governmental system as one built on checks and balances designed to prevent tyranny. But we find a President Elect today who is openly disdainful of the rule of law, without any other branch likely to check any attempt he might make to overstep his authority.

While it seems absurd, it is certainly possible, perhaps even likely, that Trump and the Republicans might use this victory to fulfill their campaign promise to prosecute Clinton and her political enemies. President Obama may have to use his Presidential power of the pardon (much as President Ford pardoned President Nixon after Watergate) in order to prevent a constitutional crisis over whether victor of an election can use the powers of the executive branch to punish the loser.

How dark is it?

This is a hard question to answer. If we take Trump at his word and look at his mandate, he is in a position to implement much of his platform if elected. Obviously there are ways for political opponents to resist these actions through both legal avenues and protests, yet all of the most effective levers are in the hands of Trump.

During the course of the Presidential campaign, many on the left openly asked if Trump was a fascist, and occasionally went so far as to compare him to Mussolini or Hitler. I think that this strategy (one that the Clinton campaign played into by trying to brand Trump as unfit for office) backfired. The danger of comparing Trump to the worst figures of the 20th Century is that if he does not seem as bad as them the accuser ends up seeming histrionic.

I think a more interesting, and perhaps disturbing possibility, is that the liberal consensus of respect for the rule of law, commitment to global free trade, free movement of peoples, and collective security between democratic nations, might have been exceptional; and democratic authoritarianism (i.e. popularly elected leaders who reject the rule of law and liberalism) might be more common.

President Erdogan of Turkey, President Putin of Russia, and Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy are all recent examples of right wing populists who have exercised power in this way. Rather than being a deviation from the norm, the victory of Trump might be viewed as a rejection of the liberal consensus that has governed the U.S. and much of Western Europe since the end of World War II. Coming on the heels of a Brexit vote that was very much fueled by similar sentiments, and the rise of right wing populist movements on the continent, it is worth reflecting on why so many voters are rejecting the liberalism that Westerns have taken for granted for much of the last century.

Doctoring Welfare: Why ATOS must adhere to the Hippocratic Oath

By Megan Sherman. Megan is an MSc Global Politics student and student liaison officer for Momentum Southampton. As a student journalist she has written for local and national media.


 

A Stanford Sociologist recently divulged the findings of his research on how to make effective political arguments. He found the most persuasive, successful arguments reframed the argument in terms of opponents’ moral values. This approach is less polarizing, and more consensual. It finds a common ground where both parties can agree. This way, progress might be made on policy where there is usually stalemate and stagnation.

It is this consensual approach to persuasion which I am trying to emulate by asking the Government to consider making ATOS adhere to the Hippocratic Oath. The Tory Party is hardly going to be convinced to reject the logic of austerity by an appeal to their compassion. But what they can’t do is reject this motion and still lay claim to being a party that respects moral values and ancient civic traditions. So this way we may make them tacitly accept a motion that would improve the lives of people for whom the benefits assessments reforms have brought untold misery.

The idea behind my petition was simple. People who make decisions that affect the lives of the ill are usually expected to adhere to an ethical code. Although technically the Hippocratic Oath is not a requirement for UK doctors, they are nonetheless expected to abide by the principle ‘Do No Harm.’ Arguably this ought to be a requirement for all organs of state. ATOS processes directly affect the health and wellbeing of the people who are the objects of their assessment, and it is the corporate approach of reducing people to an objectified, dehumanized thing that is causing the trouble with ATOS, so the need for a more humanistic approach that respects the rights and dignity of patients has never been more acute.

Smart people will notice and say that ATOS already has a code of ethics. But ATOS writing their own code of conduct is like the accountants and banks being seconded to write tax evasions law. Corporations cannot be entrusted to uphold ethical codes by themselves. They must be subscribed to a legal code which punishes a failure to abide by strict ethical regulations. ATOS can’t audit its own ethics for the same reason NGOs can’t audit their transparency structures themselves.

It is no exaggeration to say that welfare reforms have been a death penalty for some. The campaigns of disability activist groups shine a light on the troublesome correlation between DWP assessments and suicide. Films like I, Daniel Blake make an emblem of the struggles of genuinely unwell people against a suspicious, hyper-vigilant system that fails to treat the objects of its processes with compassion and respect. Political commentators with affinity for the struggles of the disabled try to bring their concerns to the attention of mainstream opinion.

I think the time is now for Parliament to debate bringing in a code of ethics for companies who deal with our sick citizens. If a doctor mistreats a patient, she is held accountable at tribunal. If an MP damages the interests of somebody in their constituency, she is held accountable at the ballot box. Perhaps, now, it is time for ATOS to be at a tribunal, being heard for its own deficiencies, instead of punishing those it perceives in others.

Please follow this link to the petition.

Did Brexit increase hate crimes? Probably, yes.*

By Dan Devine. Dan is a PhD student in Politics at Southampton. He specialises in comparative politics, political attitudes and quantitative methods (@DanJDevine, personal websiteAcademia.edu).


Tl;DR: Brexit probably caused an increase in hate crimes. I provide descriptive and statistical (linear regression and regression discontinuity) evidence for this claim, but the claim that there was a rise in reporting rather than hate crimes per is also plausible. It’s also positive to see that this is not a lasting effect (at least in the data), although there is still an upward trend in hate crime since 2013.


In the wake of Brexit – when the UK voted to leave the European Union – there was a flurry of activity in newspapers and across the internet reporting a rise in racial tensions and hate crimes. In the following weeks and months, this was widely reported in the Guardian (a lot), the BBCHuman Rights WatchSky NewsThe Telegraph, and I’m sure some others that I’ve missed. Nevertheless, some individuals and outlets (such as Spiked and ConservativeHome) remain extremely sceptical of the claim that the vote to leave the EU was behind a rise in hate crime – and indeed, call into question the validity of the numbers at all. 

As many outlets have picked up in the last week, the government have recently released the full figures of hate crime that cover the referendum and post-referendum months and days. This allows us a much closer look at what exactly was going on around that time (and gives me a chance to try out some new ideas at visualising data). Here, I take a look at these numbers, put them through some rough-and-ready statistical tests, and look at some other explanations of the findings. In general, though, the evidence is overwhelming that Brexit did cause a rise in hate crime. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that (at least according to the data) this does not seem to be a ‘lasting effect’, as The Independent reports.

What is hate crime?

Many of the biggest critiques of the data concern what is meant by ‘hate crime’. Hate crimes in general are defined as ‘any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic’. However, the data I use here is focused specifically on racially or religiously aggravated offences (from now, I will just call these hate crimes). This includes crimes such as: assault with or without injury, criminal damage, public fear or distress, and harassment. This also includes graffiti of a racist nature (presumably under the latter two categories), and attacks on asylum seekers or refugees (regardless of their race). 

This does mean that essentially, anyone can report something as a hate crime if they perceive it as such. In addition, it’s true that a majority of these cases go unsolved – about a quarter of offences are taken to court. I don’t want to get into the territory of disagreeing with the very definition of hate crimes (or how they’re reported) – but it’s worth being open about what is behind the analysis.

An increase in hate crime is descriptively clear

At first glance, it is clear that there was a rise in hate crime surrounding the Brexit referendum. The first graph below shows hate crimes by month since 2013. Although there is always a seasonal effect – hate crimes increase over summer – the sharp rise in June and July 2016 is startling, and the drop off in August is not particularly drastic (or at least as drastic as we would hope). From this longer-term perspective, the summer months of 2016 are outliers in the recent history of hate crime. It should be noted, however, that there is a clear upward trend in hate crime since 2013; the low point of 2016 is around the same as the high point of 2013. This upward trend should send a warning to those interested in social cohesion.

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It’s also possible, with the Home Office data, to have a more fine-grained analysis. The graph below presents daily data for the months of May, June, July and August. Once again, the dashed horizontal line indicates when the referendum took place. The interesting part of this is the sudden increase the day after the referendum, which persists for several days, peaking approximately a week after (more on this later).  There is, as in the monthly data, a slow decline to pre-referendum levels.

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From both of these graphs, it is clear that there was a peak in hate crime surrounding the referendum. But there is also a lot of variability, and some claim that this is not necessarily down to the referendum. In lieu of suitable data to test the competing claims, I wanted to look at this statistically as best I could.

And the differences are statistically significant

To do this, I took two approaches. I make no claim that these are conclusive. They are relatively back-of-the-envelope tests, but I think they are nonetheless strong evidence for the impact of Brexit on hate crimes (for those interested, details are at the end). The first tests how much variation can be explained by the referendum, and how many hate crimes can be attributed to Brexit. What the results indicate is that Brexit increased hate crimes by about 31 a day (if we use the daily data), or by 1600 a month (if we use the monthly data). Due to the few months following the referendum, I would say the daily data is more accurate. Importantly, the results indicate that Brexit explains about 35% of the crimes in the days following Brexit – which is a statistically and substantively significant amount.

But regressions are flawed for a range of reasons, especially when done like this. As is clear from above, hate crimes slowly decrease after the peak. In other words, June and July are huge outliers. So, as another check I carried out a regression discontinuity test (again, details at the end). This narrows the focus to the days surrounding the referendum, and essentially treats the referendum as an experiment: the day of the referendum and afterwards are those ‘treated’ with the experiment, whilst those before are the control group. In other words, there should be no real difference between June 21st and June 24th other than the referendum.

The results are the same. It is statistically significant. Moreover, in the ‘RD Plot’ at the end of the post, you can see how this relationship changes dramatically. Put another way: the days either side of the referendum are fundamentally different, and the only plausible explanation is the referendum. Indeed, this is what the regression discontinuity provides extremely strong evidence for.

But was there really an increase in hate crime?

The evidence in the data is extremely strong. However, there can be a few objections which are more theoretical. The first, and most important, is that the difference might be due to an increased awareness and therefore increased reporting (this is what the police claimed at the time). In other words, hate crimes did not increase, but the reporting of them did. This is certainly plausible.

In the days following the referendum, I find this hard to believe. Why would people be more likely to report hate crimes following a referendum? This did not happen after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, or Paris attacks, or other elections, or the start of the Palestine-Israel conflict – events which are more closely tied to the potential for hate crime. It only increased slightly even after the murder of Lee Rigby. The reverse is much more plausible: that hate crimes (remember, this includes damage to property and graffiti) ensued after the referendum. However, the peak of hate crimes occurred a week after the referendum. This is surely likely to be influenced by media coverage of the previous rises. Again, I think it is likely that there was indeed increased reporting of hate crimes, in response to national media coverage and the existence of more hate crime in general. In other words, I think it was a bit of both, with more hate crimes leading to coverage and more reporting (we must also remember that hate crimes are still hugely under-reported). 

Other claims I find less appealing. One might just say it is a coincidence. The statistical weight of evidence is, for me, far too strong for that. It is far less than a 1% chance that this was just a random increase which happened to occur at the exact time of the referendum. Other claims might argue about the definition of hate crime, how they are accounted for, and how few are brought to court. These are not the focus of this post – not because they’re not important, but because they can’t be drawn from the evidence here.

Brexit, hate crime and the future

A lot of coverage has argued that the atmosphere in the UK is increasingly toxic and intolerant. The data released only extends a few months after the referendum, so we cannot be sure of what’s actually happening. But from the existing data, I would conclude that the actual impact of Brexit on hate crimes was a short-lived one, and that the effect will decrease over time.

However, I would also suggest, on a more negative note, that all Brexit did was mobilise latent attitudes into behaviour. In other words, I do not think it changed attitudes that much, but acted as a catalyst to change those attitudes into actual actions – and hate crimes. This is in part evidenced by the general upward trend in hate crimes since 2013. For what it’s worth, going forward, the media and politicians need to be extremely careful not to stoke the flames of these attitudes. The referendum has shown that it does not necessarily take much to spark an increase in hate crimes. Other catalysts are possible. And it’s important that, when the next one comes, it is much harder to translate these beliefs into actions. 

*Probably = almost certainly

 


Statistical/methodological notes:

Summary

Graphics and tests were produced in the software package R, using data from the Home Office. The background design for the graphs was taken from code by Max Woolf

Summary statistics for the two data sets used (monthly and daily data):

Statistical Tests

Firstly, I ran a basic regression on both the daily and monthly data. This uses the referendum to ‘predict’ the variation in hate crimes after the referendum. The regressions were run using the variable ‘brexit’ as a binary predictor for the dependent variable ‘hate.crime’. Clearly for the monthly data, this is hugely unbalanced, so should be treated with a bucket load of caution. The daily data is more stable.

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The regression discontinuity used the day after the referendum as the cut off. This is because the referendum really would not have had an effect until the result. Nevertheless, it is centred around 0, the day of the referendum. It is statistically significant as well. Additional analysis by Professor Will Jennings, using a time series intervention model, confirmed the findings here. The debate about whether to use a time series or discontinuity approach continues…

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The R code used is as follows. You will need the theme function downloadable from here. If you’d like the data, please contact me (D.J.Devine@Soton.ac.uk)

setwd(“”) # set your working directory

hate <- read.csv(“day.hate.csv”) # read in the data
hate2 <- read.csv(“month.crimes.total.csv”)

install.packages(“rdrobust”) #install packages
library(“rdrobust”)
install.packages(“ggplot2”, dependencies = TRUE)
library(“ggplot2”)
library(“stargazer”)
library(“lubridate”)
library(“tseries”)
library(“scales”)
library(“grid”)
library(“RColorBrewer”)
install.packages(“extrafont”)
library(“extrafont”)
loadfonts() # note, loading the fonts package will take considerable time depending on the machine
pdf(“plot_garamond.pdf”, family=”Garamond”, width=4, height=4.5)

rdrobust(hate$hate.crime, hate$since.ref, c = 1 ) # regression discontinuity
rdd_est <- rdrobust(hate$hate.crime, hate$since.ref, c = 1 )
rdplot(hate$hate.crime, hate$since.ref, c = 1)

stargazer(hate, type=”html”,
title = “Summary Statistics for Daily Data”)
stargazer(hate2, type=”html”,
title = “Summary Statistics for Monthly Data”) # summary statistics, output in HTML

linear.day <- lm(hate$hate.crime ~ hate$brexit) # regular regression on day
linear.month <- lm(hate2$hate.crime ~ hate2$brexit) #… and months
stargazer(linear.day, linear.month, type=”html”,
title = “The Effect of Brexit on Hate Crimes”,
column.labels = c(“Daily Crime”, “Monthly Crime”),
coviariate.labels=”Brexit”) # table of the regression

month.crime.plot <- ggplot(data=hate2, aes(x=id, y=hate.crime)) +
fte_theme() +
geom_line(color=”#c0392b”, size=1.45, alpha=0.75) +
geom_vline(xintercept=42, linetype = “longdash”, color = “gray47″, alpha = 0.7) +
geom_text(aes(x=42, label=”Referendum”, y=2300), colour=”gray36″, size=8, family=”Garamond”)+
ggtitle(“Hate Crimes in England and Wales, 2013-2016”) +
scale_x_continuous(breaks=c(6,12,18,24,30,36,42),
labels=c(“June 2013”, “Dec 2013”, “June 2014”, “Dec 2014”, “June 2015”, “Dec 2015”, “June 2016”)) +
labs(y= “# Hate Crimes”, x=”Date”) +
theme(plot.title = element_text(family=”Garamond”, face=”bold”, hjust=0, size = 25, margin=margin(0,0,20,0))) +
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(family=”Garamond”, face=”bold”, size = 20, margin=margin(20,0,0,0))) +
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(family=”Garamond”, face=”bold”, size = 20, margin=margin(0,20,0,0))) +
geom_hline(yintercept=2000, size=0.4, color=”black”) # monthly graph

day.crime.plot <- ggplot(data=hate, aes(x=id, y=hate.crime)) +
fte_theme() +
geom_line(color=”#c0392b”, size=1.45, alpha=0.75) +
geom_vline(xintercept=54, linetype = “longdash”, color = “gray47″, alpha = 0.7) +
geom_text(aes(x=54, label=”Referendum”, y=85), colour=”gray36″, size=8, family=”Garamond”) +
ggtitle(“Hate Crimes in England and Wales, May-August 2016”) +
scale_y_continuous(limits=c(75,220)) +
scale_x_continuous(breaks=seq(14,123, by=14),
labels=c(“14 May”, “28 May”, “11 June”, “25 June”, “9 July”, “23 July”, “6 August”, “20 August”)) +
labs(y= “# Hate Crimes”, x=”Date”) +
theme(plot.title = element_text(family=”Garamond”, face=”bold”, hjust=0, size = 25, margin=margin(0,0,20,0))) +
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(family=”Garamond”, face=”bold”, size = 20, margin=margin(20,0,0,0))) +
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(family=”Garamond”, face=”bold”, size = 20, margin=margin(0,20,0,0))) +
geom_hline(yintercept=75, size=0.4, color=”black”) # daily graph


 

How not to write about female leaders

By Beata Rek, PhD student in Politics, @BeataRek (https://twitter.com/beatarek). You can find more about Beata here.


 

As Angela Merkel, Theresa May and Hillary Clinton, as well as many other women, rise to the political top, it may be reasonable to theorise that the glass ceiling is no longer a barrier for women in politics. However, the situation of female politicians might not be quite as simple as it may seem at first sight. Indeed, although women could have smashed the glass ceiling into smithereens, it does not yet mean that all the issues which they face – for example media coverage – are over.

When analysing this year’s press coverage of the Conservative leadership election, at some point I observed a significant increase in the number of articles about female leaders from different parts of the globe. This was around the time when all male candidates were eliminated one by one, and the election turned into a two-woman race. However, what the media gave with one hand by praising female politicians for all their hard work and achievements, it took away with the other by referring to them as ‘cleaners’ who are there to pick up the pieces of their male predecessors. Moreover, the media undermined their authority by suggesting that women might have won their positions only as a result of political instability. An article in the Guardian suggesting that ‘all we need is just someone who will lead us out from the mess‘ and a piece in the Independent arguing that Theresa May “is criticised for being dull – but that’s exactly what Britain in turmoil needs” are just a few of many examples.

Even though the press give the impression of writing about female politicians in a positive light, in reality it also sends a veiled, negative message. First of all, by writing that women are cleaning the mess made by men, the media did not present women as an equal part of the political scene. Indeed, ‘othering’ women from male politicians has been previously described in the academic literature and examples of such practices include unnecessarily labelling their gender (and not doing so for males) or emphasising how ‘rare’ is a woman’s appointment for the particular office. Similarly, reducing the role of female politicians to fixing the damage done by men does not aid creating a gender-equal environment, and potentially limits their chances for being elected in the future as well as undermines their authority.

Second of all, while writing about May and Leadsom, the press had a tendency to mention that the election is taking place in the time of political crisis. One message from so-constructed statements is that women’s success might not be related to their abilities, but rather to unusual political circumstances. This might thwart their position as candidates who are able to win in every situation, while in the future, once the crisis is over, this could also pose a question whether a woman is still a good choice. Therefore, the media could devaluate the candidates, by linking their success with times of turmoil, rather than attributing it to their experience and potential ability to successfully run a country.

While in the past there have been more severe examples of gendered coverage, framing of females as ‘political cleaners’ is yet another confirmation that more changes in press attitudes towards women are required. It is a well-established fact that women are a part of politics for quite a while now, and thus it is shameful that in 2016 the media still relegate women to “postmodern Elektras in suits and rubber gloves” who are supposed to clean the mess caused by men.