Lessons for FIFA from the Salt Lake City Olympic scandal

Diptic

By Will Jennings, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of Southampton (Academia.edu, Twitter). You can read more posts by Will Jennings here.


FIFA is in crisis. Nine current or former senior officials have been charged by US prosecutors over bribes totalling more than US$150m over 24 years. The allegations have shocked the football world.

The story so far has some parallels with the scandal that engulfed the Olympics’ governing body, the IOC, in the late 1990s. The way the IOC dealt with that crisis might offer some lessons for how FIFA should respond.

In 1998, revelations concerning the bidding process for the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympics led to investigations and a series of disclosures about bid-related malfeasance at other Olympic games. Officials from the Salt Lake bid committee were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit bribery, fraud and racketeering.

It turned out that officials from applicant cities had been lavishing IOC members and their families with payments, gifts and luxurious hospitality, as well as scholarships, with the aim of buying their votes. The revelations were highly damaging for the IOC, clashing as they did with the idealistic rhetoric that the Olympic movement had sought to harness.

Reputation salvaging

Looking back, it is arguable that the IOC’s response to the crisis salvaged its reputation and led to important reforms aimed at the long-term sustainability of the event. This is in deep contrast to FIFA’s reaction to its first corruption scandal in 2011 – which simply allowed a serious governance problem to fester.

The IOC’s response to its bribery scandal was an effective approach to managing reputational risk: Apologise. Investigate. Punish. Reflect. Reform. In the immediate aftermath of the revelations, numerous senior figures in the IOC expressed regret and contrition, soon followed by internal investigations into wrongdoing.

As a result of these probes, a substantial number of IOC members resigned or were expelled, while an extensive programme of institutional reflection and reform was quickly instigated through the creation of the IOC 2000 Commission, which included external members. Out of this review came important reforms, including the introduction of a code of ethics and a ban on IOC members who were not serving on its Evaluation Commission from visiting candidate cities.

IOC president at the time of the scandal, Juan Antonio Samaranch.
EPA

A big hole

Questions remain, however, whether FIFA will be able to learn from these lessons to dig itself out of a very big hole. For one thing, while the Olympic bribery scandal was undoubtedly damaging to the image of the event and to the IOC as its governing body, the allegations largely related to members of the Olympic movement who were not on its executive board.

The FIFA allegations have hit much closer to home in relation to the administrative machinery of world football. The charges involve two vice-presidents of the organisation and other senior officials. This is deeply ironic given that commenting on the Salt Lake affair, in 1999, Sepp Blatter observed that the smaller size of FIFA’s executive made it less easy to sway: “Twenty-one members is really a group of people that are easier to supervise than a group of 114.”

The US Department of Justice charges point to a much more systematic pattern of kickbacks and patronage that, if proven, will be less easy to blame on a few bad apples. Indeed, FIFA’s defiant response to the bribery accusations levelled at it in 2011 will make it difficult to claim it had missed the warning signs.

While FIFA might take the lesson that contrition and meaningful reform are both important steps in starting to salvage the wreckage of the governance of world football, this may not be enough. As it stands, FIFA and its leadership seems irreparably damaged in terms of its credibility and legitimacy. This before criminal proceedings threaten a lengthy period of organisational fire-fighting and paralysis.

 

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Polling Observatory Latest #GE2015 Forecast: the Conservatives make slight gains, but the likeliest result is deadlock

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


As we enter the closing stretch of the campaign, substantial uncertainty remains about the final outcome. Taking out the random noise, the polls are still showing a close race ahead of May 7th. Some have pointed to differences between telephone and internet pollsters, with the former having shown a steady, if slight, Conservative lead all year. Our method allows us to control for systematic differences between polling houses and variation in the ‘poll of polls’ that is due to changes in the mix of pollsters in the field at a given point in time.

The latest Polling Observatory forecast covers all polls completed up until April 30th, and shows support for the two main parties is still in the balance – with Labour on 33.1% and the Conservatives on 34.2% — though the confidence intervals are such that we cannot say for certain that the Conservative lead is greater than zero.

Our vote forecast points to a higher level of support for the Conservatives than two weeks ago, up 1.4 points at 35.0%, with Labour on 32.6%, up 0.1 points. This reflects the squeeze that the “big two” have put on other parties in the final weeks of the campaign. The Conservative lead now stands at 2.4%, but with considerable uncertainty remaining in our forecast.

Forecast 01-05-15

This slight shift in the balance of polling is reflected in our latest seat estimates. The Conservatives’ median estimate rises by six seats, Labour falls by six seats, and the Liberal Democrats fall by four.  This puts the median Conservative seat lead at just two. However, as the confidence intervals attached to our estimates reveal, this projected lead is highly uncertain, a veritable coin-flip, with a 53 per cent chance that the Conservatives will have more seats than Labour. A majority for either is at present very unlikely, e.g., the likelihood of a Conservative majority is tiny (less than 0.2%). Our estimates further reflect the gains made by the SNP in recent polling in Scotland, with the nationalists now forecast to win 54 out of 59 seats north of the border.

Table 1: Seat estimates, with confidence intervals and change on April 15th

Party March 1st estimate April 1st estimate April 15th estimate April 30th estimate
Conservative 265 271 268 274 (+6)

(251,305)

Labour 285 276 278 272 (-6)

(244, 295)

Liberal Democrat 24 27 28 24 (-4)

(18, 29)

UKIP 3 3 3 2 (-1)

(1, 4)

SNP 49 49 49 54 (+5)

(46, 58)

Others 6 6 6 6

(4, 8)

Northern Ireland (not forecast) 18 18 18 18

The Conservatives’ paths to a governing coalition are even more winding than their slight lead in votes and seats. They cannot reach a majority with the backing of the Liberal Democrats (combined 298 seats, 15 short of a majority) or with both the Liberal Democrats and the Northern Irish DUP (combined 306 seats, assuming the DUP once again win 8 seats), or even by adding UKIP to that two party combination (308 seats total). It would be very hard, with this seat outcome, for the Conservatives to sustain a government without some form of acquiescence from the SNP. Things are rather more promising for Labour.  While they cannot reach a majority with the help of the Liberal Democrats (combined 300 seats), they can with SNP.  Whether that happens remains to be seen, of course.

Table 2: Most plausible governing combinations, based on March and April seat forecasts

Party March 1st estimate April 1st estimate April 15th estimate April 30th estimate
Conservatives + Lib Dems + DUP 298 307 305 306
Conservatives + Lib Dems + DUP + UKIP 301 310 308 308
Labour + SNP 334 325 327 326
Labour + Lib Dem 309 303 306 300
Labour + SDLP + Plaid Cymru + Green + Lib Dem 316 310 313 307
Labour + Lib Dem + SNP 358 352 355 354
Labour + SDLP + Plaid Cymru + Green + Lib Dem + SNP 365 359 362 361

Our projected numbers suggest that while the ballots may all have been counted by May 8th, the shape of the new government may be up in the air for some time after.

Update: we have mow updated our forecast with all polls up to the end of Tuesday 5th May, giving the final Polling Observatory forecast for this parliament:

Conservatives 34.5% (32.6, 36.4)

Labour 32.4% (29.7, 35.2)

Liberal Democrats 8.7% (6.9, 10.6)

In terms of seats, this translates into:

Labour 273 (246, 295)

Conservatives 271  (248, 299)

Liberal Democrats 24 (19, 28)

Scottish National Party 55 (49, 59)

Ukip 2 (1, 4)

Other 6 (4, 9)

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

Polling Observatory analysis cited in OfCom’s statement on party election broadcasts

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


Regular readers of the blog might be interested to know that our Polling Observatory analysis of support for the parties (a joint venture between the Universities of Southampton and Manchester, Simon Fraser University and the University of Texas at Austin) featured today in OfCom’s statement on party election broadcasts. You can read the full OfCom report, ‘Review of Ofcom list of major political parties for elections taking place on 7 May 2015’, here.

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

Polling Observatory #45: Parties neck-and-neck as we approach the formal campaign

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


This is the forty-fifth in a series of posts that report on the state of the parties as measured by opinion polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. If there can ever be a definitive assessment of the parties’ standings, this is it. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates of public opinion can be found here.

UK 01-03-15 anchor on average

As we approach the electoral business-end of this parliament, the party machines are gearing up for the campaign proper – with a lot of nervous watching of the polls for signs of a sea change in opinion. Are the public steady in their voting intentions, or are they starting to move as polling day nears? Our latest report tracks the polls up to March 1st, so just before the eruption of ‘debate-gate’ arguments about the Prime Minister’s reluctance to appear in televised debates, and before the most recent run of polls that look potentially more favourable for the Conservatives, though as ever we reserve judgement until the underlying trend is clear.

Our evidence suggests that the parties remain neck-and-neck, with Labour support at 32.2% the same as last month, and the same as our estimate at the start of December too. The most recent erosion in Labour’s lead, which has now all but disappeared, has not been due to a decline in Labour support, as was true for most of last year, but instead due to  a slight improvement in Conservative fortunes. The Tories have gained 0.3 points this month, rising to 31.5%, one of their best performances in the past year or two. However, despite recent gains, we still have them in the 30 to 32% rut that they have been in since the infamous “omnishambles” budget in 2012. If the more recent uptick in support seen in March’s polling to date is sustained, the Conservatives might break out of the rut just as the election finish line approaches. This remains to be seen.

UKIP have fallen back again, down 0.7 points to 14.8%, their lowest share since September. While not quite at the peak they achieved in the autumn, possibly due to reduced attention over the past month, Farage’s radical right outsiders have become part of the political landscape and continue to attract enough support to threaten to wreak havoc in May. The Liberal Democrats have made a slight gain, rising 0.4 points to 8.4%, but still look destined for severe electoral pain. One much-caveated forecast based on data from the British Election Study suggesting they could win just one seat. Their fate in Parliament continues to hang on the ability of their MPs to generate ‘personal votes’ sufficient to swim against the tide of national unpopularity.

Finally, the Green surge appears to have levelled off for now. We have the party up  just 0.1 point past this month, to 6.4%. This is a new record, and puts support for the party just below the Lib Dems, but  the questions remain how ‘soft’ much of the Green vote is as Election Day approaches, and how effective the Greens will be in channelling rising national popularity into successful local campaigns.

Based on these current estimates of support for the parties, our vote forecast points towards a result in May that is too close to call. We put both Labour and the Tories on 33.7% but with a wide range of uncertainty.  Our forecast indicates that Labour support could fall within the 30.1% to 37.2% range and Conservative support in a slightly narrower range — between 31.9% and 34.4%. In short, history suggests there is still time for either Labour or the Conservatives to pull ahead, though neither has a clear advantage right now. The Liberal Democrat forecast continues to edge downwards as the long hoped for recovery in support continues to elude them. It now stands at 8.8%, which would be just over a third of the vote that they won in May 2010.

Vote Forecast 01-03-15

As the four party politics of 2014 has given rise to five or six party politics, and as UKIP and the SNP appear to have become part of the electoral landscape that has proved resilient, the Polling Observatory team has produced its first set of forecasts at the constituency level. On Friday, 13 March, 2015, we will release these seat level forecasts, along with an explanation of how our model of constituency simulations works, and  estimates of each party’s chances in every seat.

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

Generational Divide When ‘Doing Politics’ Vanishes on Need to Fix It

By Gerry Stoker, Mark Evans, and Max Halupka. Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton and Fellow and Centenary Professor in the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis at University of Canberra (Twitter). You can read more posts by Gerry Stoker here.


Are younger generations apathetic about politics, combining complacency with self-absorption, and so threatening the future of Australian democracy? One of the strongest findings from decades of research is that what citizens do politically in their early years tends to set the trend for their engagement with politics in the future. So, it matters that we understand how younger generations are engaging with democratic politics by comparison with older generations.

The findings of our survey work and analysis challenge negative stereotypes and give grounds for optimism. They show that within the younger generations are citizens with the enthusiasm and capacity to change Australian politics.

Younger generations are often defined as the problem. The Lowy Institute, drawing on its own survey work, concluded in a recent article that “the current generation of 18-29-or-so-year-olds … are not particularly interested in democracy”. It argued that:

… young Australians value their democracy less than their counterparts in Indonesia (an emerging democracy), India (a newer democracy than ours) and Fiji (not a democracy at all).

But are younger citizens uninterested in democracy? Are they switched off by politics more than other generations? We think not.

Why do generations matter?

The idea of a generation or cohort of people born around the same time is an important one in social inquiry. Cohorts matter because they are potential drivers of change in society.

The mix of continuity or change from previous generations is shaped by differences in education, peer group socialisation and unique historical experience. So society reproduces itself, but the result is likely to be a mix of stability and innovation as each generation’s experiences come into play.

We focus on four generations of Australian citizens: those born between 1925-45 – the Builders – reflecting their role in rebuilding Australia after the second world war; the Baby Boomers born between 1946-64 who are seen as having driven social change from the late-1960s onwards; Generation X (from 1965-79) and Generation Y (1980-94). These last two are of particular interest as they mostly came of voting age in the 21st century.

Ways of doing politics are many

Our survey work underpins the “Power of 1 Voice” exhibition at the Museum of Australian Democracy at Old Parliament House. Conducted by Ipsos, the survey was designed to capture a representative sample from each of the four Australian generations that we were interested in.

The first thing it tells us is that the great divide is not between engaged older generations and apathetic younger generations. In practice, both do politics, though with varying levels of enthusiasm. However, what is clear is that both do politics differently.

We asked how our respondents engaged with politics. We divided the answers into those that reflected more traditional forms of doing politics and those we labelled more contemporary.

Traditional forms included taking an active role in the community; joining a political party; presenting views to an elected representative; attending a demonstration; standing for office; taking an active part in a lobby or campaign; boycotting products for political or other value-based reasons; and the ubiquitous signing of a petition.

Contemporary forms tend to reflect the options available online. These included using social media; contributing to blogs; getting involved in an E-campaign; joining an online advocacy group; and engaging in crowd-sourced funding for a cause.

The results, presented here, show that different generations are doing their politics differently.

There is not a straight dichotomy between older generations doing everything traditionally and younger generations doing everything in a contemporary style. However, the overall pattern is very clear. The older generations do more through conventional forms of political engagement; the younger generations do more through contemporary forms.

In short, it is not that young people do not participate in politics. Rather, they participate differently through different channels.

Perceptions of effectiveness affect participation

So far all that Tables 1 and 2 tell us is that younger citizens are more comfortable with newer technology and so it’s no surprise they use it more. We did a bit more analysis to explore why younger citizens might do their politics differently. The answer is that they think that doing it that way is more effective.

It’s not a question of ease of access alone; there is a view that politics online achieves more among younger generations.

All generations judge traditional tools as effective to a degree, but older generations are stronger in their backing of traditional tools than younger generations. Younger citizens are more convinced by the efficacy of online tools. They are convinced that they have more impact that way.

That in turn suggests that these new online forms are not a passing fad, but likely to grow in significance if younger generations remain convinced that they can make a difference through online activism.

Thinking our way to a better politics

So far we have emphasised the differences between generations. But when it comes to thinking about how to reform the political system, there is a remarkable conformity across generations.

All generations think that contemporary politics is in trouble. A majority of all generations admire democratic politics for the stability and benefits it delivers and the opportunity it affords to hold politicians to account to ensure their performance in meeting citizens’ needs.

Equally, a majority of all generations’ fears about the practice of democracy coalesce around ideas that too much power is concentrated in the hands of big business and the media. Consequently, politicians too easily break the promises they have made.

The two most supported reform options can be seen as a response to this observation. The first is focused on the idea of giving citizens more influence and parties less. This might involve placing caps on political advertising and donations, more free votes in parliament, the opportunity to go for “none of the above” when voting, the right to recall MPs and the greater use of online plebiscites to give voters a chance to express their views directly.

The second option goes along with much of that agenda but is distinctive in its support for greater local decision-making. It is noteworthy that a majority of citizens appear to favour a mix of reforms combining mechanisms to free and open up representative politics with an opportunity for more direct intervention by citizens themselves.

What reforms would you make to the current system, by generation.
Authors, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, Author provided

Negative stereotyping of younger generations as apathetic, apolitical and disengaged is mad, bad and dangerous for the health of Australian democracy. Our evidence suggests that young Australians passionately believe in democratic values, possess strong political views and are actively engaged in contemporary forms of participation. They simply do not like the current politics on offer through traditional forms of participation.

The message to mainstream political institutions and parties is clear. A new politics is required to win the hearts and minds of young Australians to ensure that their democratic energies nurture and enhance Australian democracy. This different politics needs to be more participatory, open, local and digital.

It’s probably true to say that each generation has a tendency to bemoan the failings of the one that follows it. But, in our view, it is evident that politicians accuse younger voters of apathy to divert attention from their own behaviour. What they fail to see is that Australians see politicians as the source of the present crisis.


This article was originally published on The Conversation.
Read the original article.

Two Polarities of Anti-Politics: why trying to be friends with both Ukip and Green supporters won’t work for the mainstream parties

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By Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker. Will Jennings is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of Southampton (Academia.edu, Twitter) and Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton (Twitter). You can read more posts by Will Jennings here and more posts by Gerry Stoker here.


There is a polarity at the heart of British politics that is triggered by anti-politics. Both Ukip and Green supporters share a deep sense of disillusionment with the political class and functioning of British democracy. In almost every other respect, though, their grievances with what is on offer from the political mainstream diverge – leading to polarities that require both Labour and the Conservatives to defend against an attack from both their left and right flanks.

The mainstream parties recognise the threat but are in much more of a bind when it comes to how to respond than they understand. First the political disenchantment at the heart of Ukip and Green support means that their voters have stopped listening to mainstream parties to some degree and second the polarity of Green and Ukip positions means that if mainstream parties try to appease one set of voters they run the risk of simply driving others away from them.

As part of our ongoing investigation into the causes and impacts of political disaffection, we have undertaken a systematic comparison of the determinants of Ukip and Green Party support, based on the British Election Study’s Continuous Monitoring Survey (2009-13) and Internet Panel Study (2014). Full details of our analyses can be found here (the Ukip analyses replicate earlier work reported here).

The results across both periods – which start well before the height of the Ukip and Green surges – are striking. Distrust of politicians is almost as big a factor for Greens as it is for Ukip supporters (it is interesting that this effect is slightly weaker for 2014 as the Greens have picked up more popular support). The odds of someone intending to vote Green or Ukip are up to two and a half times higher (and at a minimum 50% higher) if they express distrust in politicians. People who intend to vote for UKIP and the Greens are also more dissatisfied with British democracy, dislike both David Cameron and Ed Miliband, and more likely to agree that “politicians don’t care what people like me think”. Interestingly, Greens are more likely to accept the view that “it is difficult to understand government and politics”, whereas Ukippers disagree – for them politics is not as complicated as is made out. Even controlling for the demographic and attitudinal factors identified in the popular and widely accepted Ford and Goodwin thesis, political distrust and disaffection is a major driver of support for the Greens and UKIP.

The idea that Ukip or the Greens represent a threat is not news to the political parties. Labour’s big data election analyst Ian Warren long since identified the Greens as key to understanding the distinctive geography of the new British politics. And the Tories plainly see Ukip as a major concern. But the standard mainstream party response is to focus on policy red meat that both parties should throw Ukip supporters to win them back. Disaffection with politics means this strategy may not work because those voters are less trusting of politics and so less likely, anyway, to believe the policy crackdowns and inducements they are offered. But appeasing Ukip has in turn created space for the rise of the Greens – though it remains to be seen to what extent their gains in the polls translate into votes on Election Day.

Our old politics is struggling to cope with a new world of polar opposites. While they may be disaffected and share distrust in politics and politicians, the attitudes of Ukip and Green supporters differ in important ways. Ukip voters are more likely to be male, aged 55 and over, and read right-wing tabloids. Greens are more likely to be female, younger, and not tabloid readers. Ukippers want to leave the EU are worried about immigration, and tend to be of the view that “ordinary people do not get their fair share”. They also are more likely to think that equal opportunities for ethnic minorities and gays and lesbians have gone too far. Greens on the other hand are pro-EU, more likely to express positive attitudes on immigration, believe that government should be concerned about inequality, and disagree that “too many people rely on government handouts”. They also strongly disagree that environmental protection has gone too far. In contrast to Greens, Ukip supporters tend to be less supportive of redistribution or government intervention, but still care about ordinary people getting a fair deal. They may be hacked off about the economic status quo, but Ukip supporters are not necessarily natural bedfellows for Labour’s brand of redistributive social democracy.

These results show that the Left behind thesis that the demographic of Ukip supporters means they are natural Labour voters has perhaps been overplayed – the set of policy attitudes that they express would be just at home in the “new working class” identified by Ivor Crewe in Thatcher’s heyday. These people once may have voted for Labour and Tony Blair – in the guise of “Mondeo Man” – but their policy and cultural attitudes are distinctive and not social democratic in any way. By trying to placate voters’ concerns about immigration and the EU, parties may well have driven voters into the arms of the Greens – who are the polar opposite to Ukip supporters on crucial cultural and policy attitudes.

Further Greens and UKIP supporters are not “insurgents” in any normal sense of the word (they are unarmed as far as we know!). They have a clear set of ideological dispositions and policy preferences that are not being met by the political parties or within the political system as it currently stands. That those preferences are at polar opposites highlights the impossibility for both Labour and Conservatives of mollifying both sides. Their impact on rising support for the new forces in British politics simply highlights the lack of discussion about the underlying attitudinal cleavages that are giving rise to these disparate political movements and the extent to which they are reshaping the political map.

This research is funded under the ESRC research award ‘Popular Understandings of Politics in Britain, 1937-2014’ (Nick Clarke, Gerry Stoker, Will Jennings and Jonathan Moss). See further details here.

Polling Observatory #44: Race continues to narrow with less than 100 days left

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


This is the forty-fourth in a series of posts that report on the state of the parties as measured by opinion polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. If there can ever be a definitive assessment of the parties’ standings, this is it. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates of public opinion can be found here.

UK 01-02-15 anchor on average

Politics has returned with a vengeance after a brief festive cease-fire. All the parties have moved into campaign mode with just a few months left until election day, and news schedules are now daily filled with briefings, policy announcements, and the wearying trench warfare of spin, with hyperbolic claims and counter-claims hurled back and forth. What have the voters made of it all? Our last report tracked polling up to the beginning of December, so the latest estimates from the Polling Observatory cover two months: the December lull as well as the January campaigning.

So far, there is little evidence of any decisive impact on the overall balance of power. Labour support has been stable for the past two months – our February 1st estimate of 32.2% is exactly the same as our estimate for December 1st. There has been a great deal written in the media about an alleged slump in Labour fortunes, but this story seems to be behind the curve of polling – Labour support did experience a substantial drop in the early autumn, but has been stable since. Given that much of the autumn fall in Labour support seems to be concentrated in Scotland, where the recent wave of constituency polls by Lord Ashcroft has confirmed a massive swing from Labour to the SNP, it is possible that overall support for Ed Miliband’s party has not declined at all in England and Wales in the past year.

Conservative support has picked up a bit over the past two months, but most of the gain merely recovered the ground lost in November. We now have them at 31.2%, one point behind Labour, and still stuck in the 30 to 32% band where they been marooned for almost three years. The Conservatives will hope that their positive economic message, and David Cameron’s sizeable ratings advantage over Ed Miliband, will start to deliver polling gains as the election approaches, but as yet we see little sign of this.

UKIP received less attention over the winter than they enjoyed during their vintage autumn, crowned by two by-election victories. This may explain the slight dip in their poll ratings, down 0.7 points to 15.5%. Both of the main parties will hope that Farage’s insurgents will be squeezed in a more sustained way as election day approaches, but there is no evidence of this yet – 15.5% remains above the highest ratings the party received before 2014.

The Liberal Democrats slid once again over the past two months – down 0.5% to 8.0%, a record low on our revised methodology. The party’s famed constituency campaign organisations become ever more vital to its prospects one election day as its national poll numbers continue to flatline.

The other big political story of the past two months has been the “Green surge”, with support for the environmentalists soaring, particularly among disaffected younger voters, and pushing the Liberal Democrats into fifth in some polls. This month we have for the first time added estimates for the Greens. Our systematic inspection of the polling evidence does not support the narrative of a “surge” concentrated in the past few months, which seems to be the result of selective analysis of the most favourable polls. Instead, we find that support for the Greens has been steadily increasing for about a year, and – at 6.3% – is now more than double the level recorded at the beginning of 2014. As so often in this turbulent election cycle, the true impact of the Greens’ rise is hard to gauge at present – while there is a sustained and genuine shift towards them, it is concentrated among the segment of the electorate (under 25s) that is least likely to vote, and also most likely to be adversely affected by new voter registration rules. In addition, the Greens’ organisation is relatively weak, and so there remain doubts about whether the party has the capacity to mobilise and turn out its new support base. Despite the conventional wisdom that the Greens are hurting Labour, it is striking that the rise in Green support over the past few months has much more closely mirrored the (continued) decline in Liberal Democrat support.

With the four party politics of 2014 now giving way to five or six party politics, it is becoming ever more important to consider May 2015 at the constituency level. We have been working hard on developing our constituency level prediction model over the past couple of months, and we will very shortly unveil our seat level forecasts for the election. These will then be updated regularly along with the polling estimates.

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

The Impact of Anti-politics on the UK General Election 2015

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By Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker. Will Jennings is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of Southampton (Academia.edu, Twitter) and Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton (Twitter). You can read more posts by Will Jennings here and more posts by Gerry Stoker here.


In a Public Policy @ Southampton briefing in Westminster today (slides here), Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker present evidence and analysis on the phenomenon of anti-politics and its likely impact on the 2015 General Election. The “anti-politics” phenomenon is complex but is reflected in negative attitudes towards mainstream politics and political parties among citizens.

A void has grown between politicians and citizens and we here present longitudinal survey evidence to support that claim. It’s fair to say politics has never been that popular among British citizens. In 1944, 36% thought politicians were mainly out to do the best for their country, in 2014 that figure had dropped to 10%.

That sense of disillusionment is impacting on the General Election in two main ways:

  1. It is driving support for UKIP. The odds of someone voting UKIP are three times higher if they express distrust in politicians. When you include political distrust in a range of models based on the popular and widely accepted Ford and Goodwin thesis, political distrust has the second biggest single effect of any variable – beaten only by wanting to leave the EU (i.e. distrust of politicians has bigger effects on likelihood to vote UKIP than demographic factors, concern about immigration and dislike for the main party leaders). In short our evidence suggests that UKIP support is more about disillusionment with politics than any great cultural gap or lost voters.
  2. It is distorting the choices open to citizens as politicians duck difficult issues given their sense of not being trusted and the marketing rules that dominate the practices of political elites. The policy menus on offer are being distorted by politicians’ perceptions of what is acceptable and unacceptable to say, and aimed at the people who are involved in formal (electoral) politics. Debates about the deficit, austerity and public spending at the core of the General Election are replete with distortions, half-truths and fail to give citizens a real sense of the choices they face.

Political disillusionment does not mean that  citizens have no faith in politics, the issue that citizens have is with the current practice of politics. Our 2013 survey evidence reveals that 63% still think that politicians in government can make a difference and 52% think that they have access to the technical know-how to do so. The problem is that the way that politics is done. Some 80% of citizens that that politicians are too short-termist and focused on chasing favourable headlines, while 72% think they are too self-seeking and beholden to rich and powerful interests.

When it comes to thinking about solutions it’s difficult to imagine that mainstream parties could lead the change but that is exactly what is required. The answer is not to move onto the territory of populist challengers but instead change the way that politics is offered and give citizens real choices. After the election we need citizens’ commissions to be set up so that cross-sections of the public can lead the reform process towards a better politics.

This research is funded under the ESRC research award ‘Popular Understandings of Politics in Britain, 1937-2014’ (Nick Clarke, Gerry Stoker, Will Jennings and Jonathan Moss). See further details here.

When will UKIP implode?

Diptic

Diptic

By Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker. Will Jennings is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at University of Southampton (Academia.edu, Twitter) and Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton (Twitter). You can read more posts by Will Jennings here and more posts by Gerry Stoker here.


UKIP’s supporters show the classic signs of populism in their backing of the party. The dynamics of populism drive its beneficiaries in terms of voting support on a trajectory where surge is followed by slump. Predicting when the former will stop and the latter start is not possible as it depends on a complex set of contingent factors but that the implosion will occur for UKIP at some juncture is a racing certainty.

Populism is an embedded element in the culture of contemporary democracies. It is ready to emerge and be exploited because of a gap between widespread understanding of democracy and the rather the pragmatic reality of its everyday practice. The vision of democracy as rule by the people implies precisely that the wishes of the people will find expression in the policy and practices of government.  Citizens in the grip of populism tend to assume that the public has one voice and that it is theirs; since all reasonable people would agree with their commonsense views. Democracy in practice is messier as different interests compete to achieve compromise through backroom deals and special interests use their influence to get deals done on issues that matter a great deal to them. The gap between the visionary ideal of democracy and murky realities of its practice provide fertile ground for populism. The failures to achieve the people’s will is down to malevolent forces:  a corrupt political elite, their cosy media friends and the influence of powerful unaccountable forces. Only by ridding ourselves of “them” can “we”, the people of commonsense, get back “our” democracy.

UKIP supporters are populists in much of their outlook as a number of recent surveys tell us (see Table 1 below). More than other citizens they think politicians are out for themselves and beholden to powerful interests. They are happy to see themselves and the party they support as outsiders to the clubby and stitched-up world of Westminster politics; claiming a bias in the news coverage and the media against them more than others. In that sense many more UKIP supporters are prepared to view the current system of politics as a waste of time. In UKIP world they are the challengers or as UKIP expert Matthew Goodwin puts it Nigel Farage is “leading a modern peasant’s revolt against Westminster”.

Table 1: UKIP and populist attitudes

Opinion %  AgreeAll  Citizens % AgreeUKIP Voters Source
British politicians are out merely for themselves 48 74 YouGov/ Southampton University(October 2014)
Politics is a waste of time 26 44 YouGov/Southampton University

(June 2013)

Politics is dominated by self-seeking politicians protecting the interests of the already rich and powerful in our society 72 85 YouGov/Southampton University

(June 2013)

News media coverage of UKIP has been biased against them 44 77 YouGov(May 2014)
There is a political class, clubbing together, using their mates in the media and doing anything to stop the UKIP charge 54 92 YouGov(May 2014)

The populist dynamic that is driving the surge of support for UKIP, garnering the support of the disillusioned rather than the disengaged voters), is capable of and likely to eventually turn in on itself. The gap between the democratic ideal in the heads of their supporters and the messy reality of modern democratic politics remains in place and it provides a trap for UKIP to fall into. So when UKIP supporters see their political heroes backing the interests of big business, or when their elected representatives appear as craven as others and when simple solutions to complex problems cannot be delivered, disillusionment will drive down the party’s support just as it drove it up. Or when self-interested internal power struggles dominate media coverage of the party the drift in support can lead quickly on to implosion. In Australia, Pauline Hanson led her populist One Nation party to remarkable success in state level elections in Queensland and secured over 9% of the vote in the 1998 federal elections. Hanson’s demise was swift, however, and in the 2010 federal election One Nation polled less than 1% of votes. The established mainstream parties are not easy to shift; not least in part as they can occupy some of the issue and policy ground claimed by populist challengers.

Some claim that UKIP are fast becoming the Teflon party of British politics immune from media exposure of scandals affecting it because its base reflects a value or cultural rejection of liberal Britain and a sense of deep distrust of mainstream political parties and their media allies. The survey evidence backs up the scale of distrust held by UKIP supporters but our argument is that the Teflon factor should not be overplayed; distrust of one group of political actors can quickly spread to others. One time beneficiaries can become a target, ask Mr Clegg. Because UKIP is a party of populism it must live and die by its rules. Those rules predict a surge followed by a slump as scandals, exposure of political self-interest and failures of delivery take their toll. The bookmakers would be well advised to offer  considered odds on that possibility as well as the number of seats that UKIP will earn in May 2015 general election.

Polling Observatory #43: Stability returns with race close to dead heat

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). The homepage of The Polling Observatory can be found here, and you can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


This is the forty-third in a series of posts that report on the state of the parties as measured by opinion polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. If there can ever be a definitive assessment of the parties’ standings, this is it. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates of public opinion can be found here.

UK 01-12-14 anchor on average

After the storm, the calm. Last month we found one of the largest shifts in opinion we have recorded since 2010, as Labour support plunged nearly three points in a few weeks. This month things have been more settled. Labour have recovered slightly, rising 0.6 points to 32.2%. The Conservatives fell back a little in November, down 0.7 points to 30.0%. As a result, Labour’s lead, which had fallen to less than one percentage point at the end of October, has recovered to a still anaemic 2.2% as the Christmas break approaches. Labour will take solace from the fact that their autumn slump has halted, and that the Conservatives’ three year failure to recruit new support has continued for yet another month. The party seems never to have recovered from the damage done to its reputation by the omnishambles budget in the spring of 2012. However, a lead of two points remains awfully precarious, and as we saw in October all that Cameron’s party need is one strong month to pull ahead in the polls. Both parties will go into their Christmas break with reasons to hope, and plenty to worry about.

UKIP had another strong month in November, with Mark Reckless, their second defection from the Conservatives, comfortably elected in UKIP colours in a seat without a demographic pro-UKIP lean. The sustained upward trend in UKIP support continues for another month, as Farage’s insurgents rise to 16.2%, a new record, up one point on last month. The pollsters have now arrived at a clearer consensus on UKIP support, reflected in the narrower “confidence interval” in our estimate, shown by the dashed lines. Farage and his colleagues will certainly be among the nation’s most confident politicians going into Christmas break. A year ago, many doubted that the party could convert their rising support into Westminster seats. No longer. Now the questions under heated discussion at political Christmas parties will be: “how many seats? Where? From whom?” The party can take great pride in its achievements to date, but longer term challenges remain. Even if it were to win 10 seats, the top end of most expectations, that would see 15% of the vote converted to less than 2% of the elected parliamentary intake.

The national polling provides little Christmas cheer for the Lib Dems. We have them at 8.5% this month, the same as last month. Their struggles to hold off the challenge for fourth place from the Greens continue, though as yet we do not have an estimate of Green support. The main source of solace for Clegg’s party comes from the Ashcroft constituency polling, which shows many Lib Dem incumbents in a much stronger position than national polling suggests, although Clegg himself seems to be struggling to hold off a Labour challenge in his Sheffield Hallam seat.

This month we can also bring you an update on our national polling forecast figure. We didn’t publish a forecast last month, so the changes reported are on the figures from two months ago. Labour’s decline in the polls over that period also is reflected in our forecast, though we do anticipate some recovery from the current level. We forecast a share of 33.4% for Labour next May, representing a fall of 2.8 points over the past two months. The Conservatives’ forecast share has not risen, however – we have them winning 33.8%, up just 0.1% from October’s forecast. The Liberal Democrats are also expected to recover somewhat based on historical trends in the polls. Our current forecast is for 9.2%, up 0.5% on the previous estimate. As before, we do not make a direct forecast of UKIP support as our forecasting method is based on historical polling trends, and there is not sufficient data to apply this method to UKIP support. Forecast 01-12-14

The current polling and the forecast both point to a near dead-heat between the top two parties. Yet neither may be particularly reliable anymore as an indicator of how the next Parliament will look. British politics has never been more fragmented, and that fragmentation means geography and constituency context  could be decisive. Surging support for the SNP, UKIP and the Greens is impossible to understand without focussing on the constituency battles where these parties will look to convert votes into seats, while the fate of the Liberal Democrats will turn on whether their legendary local campaigning skills can still deliver in a Siberian climate for the national party. We will shortly unveil our seat-level forecasting model, which attempts to capture some of this variation from seat to seat and produce a more accurate assessment of how the fragmented national political competition will play out in the hundreds of local contests which will decide next year’s outcome. In the meantime, we will continue to keep our usual close watch on the polls, as the closest political contest in a generation enters its final stages.

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien