Will turnout weighting prove to be the pollsters’ Achilles heel in #GE2017?

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By Patrick Sturgis and Will Jennings, University of Southampton.


The 2017 election campaign has confounded expectations in many ways, none more so than Labour’s continuing surge in the opinion polls. From an average vote share of around 26% at the start of the campaign, they now stand at an average of 36% in the polls conducted over the past week. It is fair to say that few, if any, commentators expected Labour’s support to be at this level as we head into the final week of the campaign.

One of the theories advanced to explain Labour’s unexpectedly lofty position is that the opinion polls are, once again, wrong; their historical tendency to over-state Labour support has not been adequately addressed by the pollsters since the debacle of 2015. Key to this line of thinking is that Labour’s support appears to be ‘soft’, in the sense that those who say they will vote Labour in the polls are more likely to also report that they may change their mind before election day, compared to Conservative ‘intenders’. Labour’s core support is also concentrated within demographic groups that are, historically at least, less likely to cast a ballot, particularly younger voters.

Patterns of turnout across demographic groups will, of course, be key to determining the outcome of the election. But might turnout – and how pollsters deal with it – also be the cause of another polling miss on June the 8th?

Who will turnout and who won’t?

Adjusting for turnout is one of the most difficult tasks a pollster must confront. Polls work by collecting samples of individuals and weighting them to match the general public on characteristics such as age, gender, region, and education for which the population distribution is known. But around a third of  any representative sample of eligible voters will not vote, so an additional adjustment has to be made to filter out likely non-voters from the vote share estimate. The problem here is that there is no entirely satisfactory way of doing this.

The most obvious approach to determining whether poll respondents will vote or not is to ask them. This is indeed the way that the vast majority of polls in the UK have approached turnout weighting in previous elections. In order to allow respondents to express some level of uncertainty, pollsters usually ask them to rate their probability of voting on a 1 to 10 scale (where 1 = certain not to vote and 10 = certain to vote). The problem with this approach is that, for a variety of reasons, people are not very good at estimating their probability of voting. So turnout weights based on self-report questions tend to have high error rates, mainly of the ‘false-positive’ variety. Some pollsters use additional questions on turnout at previous elections to produce a turnout probability but these also suffer from problems of recall and socially desirable responding.

A second approach is to use historical survey data containing a measure of actual turnout (either self-reported after the election or via validation of actual votes using the electoral register). Such data is used to build a statistical model which predicts turnout on the basis of demographic characteristics of respondents. This ‘historical’ model can then be applied to current polling data in order to produce turnout probabilities based on actual turnout patterns from the previous election. While this gets round the problems with faulty reporting by respondents, with this approach we must believe that patterns of turnout haven’t changed very much since the previous election, an assumption which cannot be tested at the time the estimates are required. And, as the EU referendum showed, sharp changes in patterns of turnout from one election to another can and do arise.

In sum, turnout weighting is an essential component of accurate polling but there is no failsafe way of doing it.

The inquiry into the 2015 election polling concluded that, although the turnout probabilities used by the pollsters in that election were not very accurate, there was little evidence to suggest these were the cause of the polling errors. Might inaccuracies in the turnout weights be more consequential in 2017?

Effect of turnout weighting on vote intention estimates

We can get some handle on this by comparing the poll estimates of the Conservative-Labour margin before and after turnout weights have been applied. The table below shows estimated Conservative and Labour vote shares before and after turnout weighting for eleven recently published polls. It is clear that the turnout weights have a substantial effect on the size of the Conservative lead. Without the turnout weight (but including demographic and past-vote weights), the average Conservative lead over Labour is 5 percentage points. This doubles to 10 points after turnout weights have been applied.

 

Vote estimates with turnout weight Vote estimates without turnout weight
Pollster Fieldwork End Date CON LAB CON CON LAB CON
(%) (%) lead (%) (%) lead
ORB/Sunday Telegraph 4th June 46 37 9 44 38 6
IpsosMORI/Standard 1st June 45 40 5 40 43 -3
Panelbase 1st June 44 36 8 40 39 1
YouGov/Times 31st May 42 39 3 41 39 2
Kantar 30th May 43 33 10 40 34 6
ICM/Guardian 29th May 45 33 12 41 38 3
Survation (phone) 27th May 43 37 6 43 37 6
ComRes/Independent 26th May 46 34 12 43 38 5
Opinium 24th May 45 35 10 42 36 6
Survation (internet) 20th May 46 34 12 43 33 10
GfK 14th May 48 28 20 45 29 16
Mean  = 10   Mean  = 5
      S.D.  = 4.5  S.D. = 4.9

 

Particularly notable are the Ipsos-MORI estimates, which change a 3-point Labour lead into a 5-point lead for the Conservatives. Similarly, ICM’s turnout adjustment turns a 3-point Conservative lead into a 12-point one. It is also evident that pollsters using some form of demographic modeling to produce turnout probabilities tend to have somewhat higher estimates of the Conservative lead. For this group (Kantar, ICM, ORB, Opinium, ComRes), the turnout weight increases the Conservative lead by an average 5.4 points compared to 3.7 points for those relying on self-report questions only.

It is also worth noting that the standard deviation of the Conservative lead is actually slightly lower with the turnout weights (4.5) than without (4.9). So, the turnout weighting would not appear to be the main cause of the volatility between the polls that has been evident in this campaign.

This pattern represents a substantial change in the effect of the turnout weights compared to polls during the 2015 campaign, where the increase in the Conservative lead due to turnout weighting was less than one percentage point (for the nine penultimate published polls conducted by members of the British Polling Council).

Why is turnout weighting having a bigger effect now than it did in 2015? One reason is that many pollsters are applying more aggressive procedures than they did in 2015, with the aim of producing implied turnout in their samples that is closer to what it will actually be on election day. While there is a logic to this approach it seems, in effect, to rely on getting the turnout probabilities wrong in order to correct for over-representation of likely voters in the weighted samples.

A second reason turnout weighting matters more in this election is that the age gap in party support has increased since 2015, with younger voters even more likely to support Labour and older voters to support the Conservatives.  Thus, any adjustment that down-weights younger voters will have a bigger effect on the Conservative lead now than it did in 2015.

Corbyn-mania among younger voters?

Another idea that has been advanced in some quarters is that young voters are over-stating their likelihood to vote in this election even more than they did in 2015. Come election day, these younger voters will end up voting at their recent historical levels and Labour will underperform their polling as a result.

We can obtain some leverage on this by comparing the distributions of self-reported likelihood to vote for young voters, aged 18-24, in 2015 and 2017 (the 2017 figures are from the polls in the table above, the 2015 estimates are taken from the penultimate published polls in the campaign). We also present these estimates for the oldest age category (65+). There is no evidence here that younger voters are especially enthused in 2017 compared to 2015. And, while the implied level of turnout is substantially too high for both age groups, the 20 point gap between them is broadly reflective of actual turnout in recent elections.

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The inquiry into the 2015 polling miss found that representative sampling was the primary cause of the under-statement of the Conservative lead. The fact that implied turnout is still so high in the current polls suggests that the representativeness of samples remains a problem in 2017, on this measure at least. Turnout weighting is having a much bigger effect on poll estimates now than it did in 2015. This may be because the pollsters have improved their methods of dealing with the tricky problem of turnout weighting. However, it also suggests that getting turnout weighting right in 2017 is likely to be both more difficult and more consequential than it was in 2015.

Polling Observatory campaign report #3: All changed, changed utterly

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). You can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


This post is part of a long-running series (dating to before the 2010 election) that reports on the state of the parties as measured by vote intention polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates can be found here and here.

With just over a week to go until the general election, the campaign continues to take surprising twists and turns, not least the jaw-dropping projection of a hung parliament from YouGov for The Times.

When we first reported, shortly after the snap-election was called, the Conservatives held a commanding lead and Labour seemed to be meandering towards electoral oblivion. This remained the scenario at the start of May, though the scale of UKIP’s collapse in the polls was starting to become clear – with the Conservatives seemingly the main beneficiary. Just four weeks on, the change in Britain’s political landscape is remarkable – even if the likely outcome of the election (a decent sized Conservative majority at least) remains much the same. Labour has surged in the polls, now standing at 35.5% (up over eight points from 27.8%), while the Tories have fallen back from their initial bump after May called the election (at a still impressive 44.5%, down from the high of 45.6%). UKIP have continued to lose support at a rapid rate, with our estimates putting them at just 4.0% – less than a third of their vote in the 2015 general election just two years ago. The Liberal Democrats’ have also fallen back to just 7.8% (which would be below their catastrophic performance at the last election). Barring an even larger polling miss than occurred in May 2015, the political landscape of Britain looks like it will be redrawn in unexpected ways. There continue to be good reasons to be cautious about what the polls are currently telling us – due to the wide range of Conservative leads being shown by different polling houses and the possibility that Labour’s votes may stack up in seats in cities among younger and educated voters, where they tend to already hold large majorities, while falling away in marginal seats elsewhere.

 

UK 29-05-17 anchor on average

One of the features of our method is that it enables us to estimate the ‘house effect’ for each polling company for each party, relative to the vote intention figures we expect from the average pollster. That is, it tells us simply whether the reported vote intention for a given pollster is above or below the industry average. This does not indicate ‘accuracy’, since this will only be known on June 9th. It could be, in fact, that pollsters at one end of the extreme or the other are giving a more accurate picture of voters’ intentions. Indeed, in contrast to the 2015 election where there was convergence of the pollsters around the Conservative-Labour margin of zero, the most recent set of polls have shown Conservative leads ranging from as little as 5 points to as high as 14 points – outcomes that would have vastly different results in terms of a parliamentary majority for Theresa May.

In the table below we report the ‘house effects’ towards or against each of the parties for all polling companies who have recently conducted surveys. We, of course, estimate separate effects where the same company uses different modes (i.e. where Survation have fielded polls using both online and telephone surveys). We also (where possible) create ‘new’ polling houses where pollsters have implemented significant changes to their method and weighting procedures, though these are not always easy to date precisely. Nevertheless, the estimates give a picture of which pollsters tend to show higher numbers for which party, and thus are a handy guide for reading the latest polls with a dose of caution.

Our estimates reveal a range of house effects – and some interesting patterns too. It is first of all apparent that ComRes and ICM stand out as tending to report higher numbers for the Conservatives (+1.6 points and +1.4 points respectively) and lower numbers for Labour (-1.6 and -1.4 points). In contrast, ORB, Survation (online) and SurveyMonkey are at the other end of the spectrum — in tending to show support for the Conservatives lower and Labour higher than the industry average. Interestingly, Ipsos MORI and Panelbase show both parties higher – due mainly to their tendency to put UKIP much lower (in the case of Ipsos MORI this is a substantial 4.5 points).

House effects, by pollster

Pollster Mode Turnout filter Con Lab Lib Dems UKIP Green
YouGov Online Self-reported -0.3 (0.2) -1.0 (0.2) +0.9 (0.1) +0.4 (0.2) -0.6 (0.1)
ComRes Online Turnout model +1.6 (0.3) -1.6 (0.3) +1.3 (0.2) -0.6 (0.3) -0.3 (0.1)
Ipsos MORI Telephone Self-reported +1.2 (0.4) +2.0 (0.4) +1.5 (0.2) -4.5 (0.3) -0.3 (0.2)
Survation Online Self-reported -2.2 (0.5) +0.5 (0.5) +0.6 (0.3) +1.0 (0.4) -1.1 (0.2)
Survation Telephone Self-reported 0.0 (0.8) -0.4 (0.8) -0.3 (0.5) -0.9 (0.5) -0.3 (0.3)
Panelbase Online Self-reported +1.2 (0.7) +0.4 (0.7) -0.1 (0.4) -0.9 (0.5) -0.2 (0.3)
Kantar (TNS) Online Turnout model -0.6 (0.6) -3.2 (0.6) +1.4 (0.4) +0.7 (0.4) +1.5 (0.3)
ORB Online Self-reported -1.3 (0.6) +1.7 (0.6) -0.4 (0.4) +1.6 (0.4) +0.2 (0.2)
SurveyMonkey Online Unknown -0.8 (0.7) +0.9 (0.7) -1.9 (0.4) +1.1 (0.5) +1.6 (0.3)
Opinium Online Self-reported +0.1 (0.5) +0.7 (0.5) -0.5 (0.3) +0.4 (0.3) -0.5 (0.2)
ICM Online Turnout model +1.4 (0.3) -1.4 (0.2) +0.3 (0.2) +0.8 (0.2) +0.1 (0.1)

Pollsters have made many methodological changes since 2015, making it tricky to discern the causes of variation in these ‘house effects’. One notable feature of the methodology used by ComRes and ICM is the use of demographic turnout models to predict the propensity of individuals to vote. This has the consequence of down-weighting those respondents who have been less likely to vote in previous elections – giving rise to considerably lower Labour vote shares due to their current reliance on younger respondents and previous non-voters. In contrast, other firms such as Ipsos MORI and Opinium use self-reported likelihood to vote, giving rise to slightly higher vote shares for Labour. We will only know which of these adjustment procedures (if either) has been effective on June 9th, however.

While the Conservatives still hold a sizeable lead, the differences across pollsters could represent the difference between a huge working majority in parliament for Theresa May and an election that delivers few gains to the Conservatives contrary to all expectations.  Only time will tell who has got closest to the result.

 

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

Experience is not a dirty word

By Jenny Fleming, Professor of Criminology, Director of the Institute of Criminal Justice Research, and R.A.W. Rhodes, Professor of Government at the University of Southampton.


Government policy is to build on evidence of what works. So, we conduct randomised controlled trials, we ‘nudge’ citizens, and we evaluate policies to recover evidence of what does or does not work. No one denies that the more you know the better; but how do you acquire knowledge? More importantly what constitutes knowledge?

We ‘know’ facts and believe explanations from many sources. We draw on research, political and legal knowledge. We check out statistics and labour over government data but what we do not do is draw systematically on experiential knowledge. Experience refers to the practical knowledge about the world amassed by individuals in an organisational and work context. Such knowledge is invariably in play. It involves selective retelling of the past to make sense of the present. It is used to explain past practice and events and to justify present activity and recommendations for the future. It is the central characteristic of a craft.

What happens when research-based knowledge bumps into experience and associated craft? It becomes part of the mix. The starting point is experience. Take the example of the police. Officers draw on the collective and individual experiences of other officers; on their stories. They ‘phone a friend’ and employ their knowledge of the local area. The emphasis falls on practice because they believe the shared knowledge of practitioners is of more value than the evidence. They talk about common sense, judgement, and ‘on the street’ experience. Police officers acknowledge that anything that can assist them in doing their job more effectively is welcome but they are more likely to embrace the practical. If they go to ostensibly objective data they will use their experience to interpret it and assess its usefulness. Their experience will construct the facts and explanations; that is, the evidence they will use.

Officers do not rely only on experience. They weave together knowledge from any available and relevant sources. Too often the different kinds of knowledge are set up as opposites; research-based versus craft knowledge. Demonstrably the police draw on any source of information available to them, and use their experience to determine the information they will act on. The choice is dictated by availability. Is there any research-based knowledge? If there is no research based knowledge (and we know that the research base is currently limited), then experience is all there is. Its use is both essential and inevitable.

Evidence-based policing persists because it provides the legitimating rationale for decisions made by other means. The imprimatur of science is used to legitimise essentially political decisions. Of course, there are policy contexts that are not politicised. Of course, some evidence is better founded and more relevant for some policies than others. And let us not forget, sometimes if not often, there is rational, scientific evidence available. But much evidence-based policing takes place in charged organisational and political contexts that ensure the data are always incomplete, always uncertain, and always ambiguous. So, the meaning of evidence is never fixed, it must be constantly won. By itself, evidence-based knowledge is not enough. We need the partisans arguing for scientific evidence but we need also other types of knowledge. Craft knowledge, political knowledge, and research-based knowledge, all warrant a place at the table. These several strands need to be woven together. Craft knowledge not only needs to be treated as evidence in this weaving, but we need to recognise that it provides also the basis for choosing between the available sources of evidence.

Experience may be a dirty word to the partisans of science, but it is essential given both the limits to, and lack of, social science knowledge.

The strange case of unpopular populism: Labour and Jeremy Corbyn

By Gerry Stoker. Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton and Centenary Professor of Governance at the University of Canberra (Twitter).


Populism encapsulates the spirit of our times, we are told. So how has Labour under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn managed to discover an unpopular version of populism? In the discussion that follows, I argue that Labour’s election campaign has adopted many of the defining features of populism without winning a lot of support. What lies behind this seeming paradox?

The standard formula of populists is to position their movement of ‘the people’ against the corrupt ruling elite or establishment. Labour’s campaign emphasises that it is on the side of the millions rather than the millionaires. In his first speech of the campaign Jeremy Corbyn set a clear populist tone:

Much of the media and establishment are saying this election is a foregone conclusion. They think there are rules in politics, which if you don’t follow by doffing your cap to powerful people, accepting that things can’t really change, then you can’t win. They say I don’t play by the rules – their rules. We can’t win, they say, because we don’t play their game. They’re quite right, I don’t. And a Labour Government elected on June 8 won’t play by their rules…Of course those people don’t want us to win. Because when we win, it’s the people, not the powerful, who win”.

Labour’s manifesto is also populist in its main messages. There are proposals to spend more on education, health, social care, housing and so on with a clear indication that someone else – the rich and big business – will pay for it through extra taxes. There are commitments to renationalise core utilities notably where there are popular grievances against their performance. The essential claim is that the economy has been rigged for the rich and now it is time for change. As Corbyn puts it:

Don’t wake on up on 9 June to see celebrations from the tax cheats, the press barons, the greedy bankers, Philip Green, the Southern Rail directors and crooked financiers that take our wealth, who have got away with it because the party they own, the Conservative Party, has won”.

So, is the call to support Corbyn fighting for the many against a rigged system winning hearts and minds? Marginally, would appear to be the summary judgement. Labour has gained some support and may do better than some pundits predict. But with the collapse of UKIP support the Conservatives enjoy double figure leads over Labour in the polls – some as high as 20%. Bottom line, they are going to win the election easily. On the issues most important to voters, it appears that PM May is more trusted to deliver than Corbyn. There we have it: the odd spectacle of an unpopular populist. Why?

Is it that the media is blocking Corbyn from getting his message out? There can be little doubt that the Labour leader has little editorial support among the print media. But as his own supporters have been keen to assert this is a people’s movement using social media to spread its message. Moreover, the regulation of election coverage means that mainstream television and radio outlets have to give fair access to all candidates. There does appear to be plenty of interest in politics and in Corbyn as a candidate for PM. It seems unlikely that its media coverage that is distorting or blocking the message sufficiently to explain the lack of popular uptake.

Is it that divisions within the Labour Party means that Corbyn’s position is undermined? That Corbyn does not have support of most Labour MPs is evident but from the perspective of a popular movement it is the recruitment of activists and grassroots supporters that should provide the real momentum. Corbyn-supporting groups in the party have been vocal about their presence. The manifesto adopted by Labour and the campaign and its content all appear to be in the hands of Corbyn and his supporters. Not having the support of the New Labour establishment – and figures such as Tony Blair – could be seen as a plus for a populist, so it’s unlikely that it is divisions within the party that are undermining the cause with the public.

Another explanation might be that Corbyn’s Labour offers faux populism. Labour can afford to be radical and promise a lot because its knows it’s not going to have to deliver. The aim is to shore up support for the Corbynista project when it comes to the post-election aftermath of a Labour loss. This is cult politics rather than populist politics with the aim of creating a narrative of a heroic leader offering radical solutions, deserving another chance. That argument goes against the grain of the genuine belief that things can be turned around in Election 2017 among many Corbyn supporters and the fact the  message remains strongly populist whether or not  some in the Corbyn leadership see it in more strategic terms.

The solution to the paradox of an unpopular populism is more likely to rest on the finding that rules do apply in politics, even if Corbyn claims they do not. First even for a populist competence – or the perception of competence in the case of Donald Trump – matters. People have to believe you have the skill and will to deliver. Corbyn and his team appear to be both gaff-prone and lacking in any serious ideas about how to run anything. It may be that Corbyn sees himself as offering a form of facilitative or non-hierarchical leadership – I am here to empower others – but most of the public appear to judge him as a leader at worst as useless and at best as a dreamer. Theresa May has a net satisfaction score for her leadership of +19, while Jeremy Corbyn has score of –35.

The implication of the above explanation might be: do the same populist thing next time but with a leader with a wider appeal. However, it may be that it is also difficult to do populism within the confines of an established political party, such as Labour. The Labour Party in many parts of Britain was the party of power and in power, so it is difficult to project it as the new outsider. You might say that Donald Trump won the presidency but he did so by keeping a large part of the Republican Party’s core vote with targeted policies and using populist tactics and messaging to attract other voters, a strategy made slightly easier by the degree of polarisation that has developed in US politics over the last two decades. If being an established party is a constraint of the degree of populist stance that can work, then we are back to another old rule of politics. Parties win, including Labour, when given the UK electoral system they provide their core vote with something to support but reach out to others and in a way that shows they can make sensible compromises to deliver. The solution for a mainstream party then is not to offer populism as a cure to all ills, but rather to attempt to offer a realistic narrative about how to change the country for the better.

A pint of science event on citizenship and democracy

Two members of PAIR, Prof David Owen and Dr Ben Saunders, recently took part in Pint of Science, an international event involving researchers engaging with the public in the relaxed environment of a local pub. The View Bar is one of six Southampton venues participating this year, with the focus being Our Society. David and Ben spoke on Monday night, on the theme of citizenship and democracy.

David’s talk examined the changing boundaries of citizenship. It was once assumed that everyone would be a citizen of one and only one state where they would reside, yet this picture of exclusive citizenship has come under strain with greater international mobility. Whereas in 1960 less than a third of the world’s state recognised dual nationality, this has risen to around 70%. Further, many people no longer reside in the state(s) of which they are citizens.

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These changes raise important questions about who should be included when it comes to voting in elections and referenda. More and more states are granting voting rights to expatriate citizens abroad and/or to resident foreigners. How these boundaries are drawn has obvious important for the democratic legitimacy of the decisions that get made. For instance, an interesting consequence of the way the UK electorate is drawn is that resident Commonwealth citizens were entitled to vote in last year’s Brexit referendum, though non-UK/Ireland EU citizens were not entitled to vote, though clearly affected by the decision.

Ben’s talk concerned whether citizens have a duty to vote. Turnout in UK General Elections has actually risen in each election since 2001 (with turnout in the Brexit referendum higher still), but is still below the levels commonly seen in the mid-20th century. For many political scientists, the interesting question is not why many citizens do not vote, but why so many do, given that the expected benefit of their participation is small. It seems that many people believe in a duty to vote, which would offer one explanation for their doing so. However, it is not clear what might ground this duty.

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Moreover, most arguments for a duty to vote do not simply show that we have a duty to vote but, rather, that we have a duty to vote in some particular way (for instance, sincerely, or in an informed manner, or in good faith, etc). We can therefore distinguish between voting well and voting badly. It may be that we have a duty to vote well, but we cannot infer from this a general duty to vote, since voting badly may be worse than not voting at all. Thus, we ought not to suppose that voters are more commendable than non-voters, if we do not know anything about how they voted.

Both talks were followed by lively discussions from the floor, with pint glass prizes for the best questions. The audience also had the chance to participate in several activities, including designing their own micro-state, playing Totalitarian Top Trumps, and taking part in a pub quiz based on the UK citizenship test.

Justice and Natural Resources

By Chris Armstrong, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Southampton.


Struggles over precious resources such as oil, water, and land are increasingly evident in the contemporary world. States, indigenous groups, and corporations vie to control access to those resources, and the benefits they provide. As the controversy over the Dakota pipeline in the US illustrates, those conflicts can be intense. Moreover, whereas international law provides states with an extensive set of rights over domestic resources, these conflicts are rapidly spilling over into new arenas, such as the deep oceans and the Polar icecaps. Engineers and scientists are hard at work developing the technology which would be needed to access mineral deposits, or valuable forms of biodiversity, in these otherwise inhospitable regions.

Humanity will therefore face crucial decisions, in coming decades, about how these precious resources should be governed, and how the benefits and burdens they generate should be shared. This is a question political theorists have argued about for centuries. Should our ‘appropriation’ of the world’s resources be relatively unconstrained, so that they can be gobbled up on a first-come-first-served basis? Or should appropriation be constrained in light of the claims we all have on these precious resources, which none of us, after all, played any hand in creating? Should the world’s resources be seen as a treasury for the alleviation of global poverty or inequality?

Questions of natural resource justice, then, are crucially important. Our answers to those questions will resonate with some of the most significant controversies within political theory today: what are the demands of global justice? How can we fairly share the costs of dealing with climate change, or threats to biodiversity? What, if anything, justifies the territorial rights of states, including the right to ‘freely dispose’ of the natural resources within each state’s territory?

Justice and Natural Resources is the first book-length treatment of these issues, and provides a systematic theory of natural resource justice. It argues that we should use the benefits and burdens flowing from these resources to promote greater equality across the world, and share governance over many important resources. It also illustrates the implications of this theory for a series of pressing real-world issues, including the scope of state resource rights, the claims of indigenous communities, rights over ocean resources, the burdens of conservation, and the challenges of climate change and transnational resource governance.

Polling Observatory #GE2017 campaign report #2:

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). You can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


This post is part of a long-running series (dating to before the 2010 election) that reports on the state of the parties as measured by vote intention polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates can be found here and here.

The Polling Observatory is now able to report on polling from the first fortnight of the election campaign. Our estimates show several notable changes on last time. Firstly, the Conservatives gained nearly three points after announcement of the general election but in the last week this gain has stalled – with their support now standing at around 46%. The big losers in the polls so far are UKIP – who have dropped several points in just the last two weeks (now at 7%). Indeed, their support has almost halved since mid-February, pointing to a bleak electoral outlook for the party. As we noted last time, UKIP’s collapse has closely mirrored the surge in Conservative support. Contrary to expectations, Labour has gained in the polls – with its support now standing at 28%, two points higher than in our last report. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats have fallen back slightly, at 10% still only a couple of points higher than their disastrous performance in 2015.

So far, the polls tell a pretty clear and straightforward story: a towering Conservative lead over their main challengers Labour, the collapse of UKIP and marginal revival of the Liberal Democrats. Whether any surprises lie in wait for us in the next five weeks depends largely upon whether the early Conservative surge wears off at all and whether Corbyn’s Labour can muster further gains in support that would deny Theresa May the landslide that looks on the cards.

UK 01-05-17 anchor on average

 

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

Polling Observatory campaign report #1: reading polling tea leaves in the shadow of the bonfire of the experts

DipticBy The Polling Observatory (Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien). You can read more posts by The Polling Observatory here.


This post is part of a long-running series (dating to before the 2010 election) that reports on the state of the parties as measured by vote intention polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates can be found here and here.

It has been almost 18 months since the Polling Observatory’s last investigation of the Westminster polls, though the intervening period has seen dramatic political events – Britain’s vote to leave the EU, a change in Prime Minister, and much more besides.

The surprise result of the 2015 general election prompted much reflection on the reliability of polling methodologies – most notably in the report of the official inquiry into the pre-election polls – as did the outcome of the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. The vanquishing of the polls, and election forecasts, has added fuel to the bonfire of the experts. To populists, the unpredictability of voters may serve to further undercut the authority of elites.

While the events of 2015 and 2016 provided a valuable reminder that a dose of caution is needed when digesting the latest polls, they remain the best way of assessing relative shifts in public opinion.

As regular readers will know, we pool all the information that we have from current polling to estimate the underlying trend in public opinion, controlling for random noise in the polls. Our method controls for systematic differences between polling ‘houses’ – the propensity for some pollsters to produce estimates that are higher or lower on average for a particular party than other pollsters. While we can estimate how one pollster systematically differs from another, we have no way of assessing which is closer to the truth (i.e. whether the estimates are ‘biased’). This was where our election forecast came unstuck in 2015, as the final polls systematically over-estimated support for Labour and under-estimated support for the Conservatives.

Because most pollsters have made methodological adjustments since May 2015 – designed to address this over-estimation of Labour support – it is inappropriate to ‘anchor’ our estimates on their record at previous elections. Instead, we anchor our estimates on the average pollster. This means the results presented here are those of a hypothetical pollster that, on average, falls in the middle of the pack. It also means that while our method accounts for the uncertainty due to random fluctuation in the polls and for differences between polling houses, we cannot be sure that there is no systematic bias in the average polling house (i.e., the industry as a whole could be wrong once again).

Our latest analyses are based on polls up to April 18th, the day of the announcement of the general election to be held on June 8th. Since then, a number of polls have suggested an even larger Conservative lead – and it will be interesting to see if this is sustained in coming weeks of the campaign. The Polling Observatory’s headline figures currently put the Conservatives on 43%, far ahead of Labour on 25.7%. The Liberal Democrats at 10.5% have overtaken UKIP, at 9.8%, for the first time since December 2012. Meanwhile the Greens are lagging well behind at 4.3%.

UK 19-04-17 anchor on average

Our estimates also provide insights on the trends in support for the parties since May 2015. Under David Cameron, support for the Conservatives had been slipping, especially in early 2016. It was only immediately following the EU referendum vote, and around the time that Theresa May took over as PM, that they have enjoyed a sharp rise in support. In contrast, Labour’s support has steadily been declining since April 2016 – from around the start of the EU referendum campaign. This is well before ‘the coup’ that some have blamed for Labour’s poor polling. We find no evidence to support those claims here.

While UKIP support rose steadily in the year following the 2015 general election, it slumped after the Brexit vote and has continued to decline since. It is too soon to write off UKIP for good, but it is clear that the party faces an uncertain future, threatened by an emboldened Conservative Party plotting Britain’s course out of the EU. By contrast, Brexit has given a renewed purpose to the Liberal Democrats, whose support has steadily been increasing since June 2016 – though hardly at a dramatic rate. The largely static support for the Greens highlights that Britain’s ‘progressive’ parties face an uphill battle to win back voters.

The trends since Brexit specifically point towards two gradual shifts: UKIP voters switching to the now more pro-Brexit Conservatives (with the blue and purple lines mirroring each other quite closely above), and the Liberal Democrats slowly recovering, seemingly at the expense of Labour who are slowly declining. The parties that appear to have benefited from Brexit are those now seen as the natural issue ‘owners’ of Leave and Remain.

So the two mainstream parties with clear Brexit positions are rising in the polls, while the one without a clear position (Labour) is declining steadily.

During the election campaign we will provide updates on the state of support for the parties. We will also be undertaking analyses of what ‘the fundamentals’ – such as party leader ratings and the state of the economy – tell us about the likely election result. Our aim will be to provide an assessment of election forecasts generated using different methods and data. After the experience of 2015, where the polling miss threw many forecasts off, we believe that this approach of triangulation may bolster confidence in expectations about the likely result – and also illuminate how different modelling choices and assumptions matter.

Robert FordWill JenningsMark Pickup and Christopher Wlezien

Research Reflections from an Outsider, cum Insider, during Field work in Uganda

By Eunice Akullo (Phd Candidate, University of Southampton). 


eunice

(Visual art image by Rolands Tibirusya)

This article presents a narrative of my July and September 2016 data collection experience for research exploring the integration of children born in captivity in three sub-regions of Uganda. Following the end of the research, I was puzzled about my identity/position as a young, female researcher and decided to reflect upon the process. The narrative below provides an account of the research experience and explains the complex nature of my identity as crosscutting between insider and outsider. It also explains how gatekeepers were vital in accessing some of the respondents and in providing guidance on how to conduct the research.

The quotation below, captured in my diary, represents my thoughts after one of the weeks of the fieldwork. My PhD research explores the integration of children born in captivity to females abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

Community members received me with pre-conceived expectations. I remember one elderly male voluntarily offering me advice as I embarked on my field travels. He advised me to mind what I said, what I wore and how I behaved among the fieldwork communities to avoid being misunderstood. I enjoyed dressing up in long skirts and long dresses, and interacting with participants according to culturally expected norms. Having grown up this way, not much was surprising though. What concerned me was the feedback. Some respondents appeared surprised by my gestures. Others clutched on to their high cultural standards! The idea that a number of highly educated women around here despised folks in their community also took me by surprise!

Captured thoughts such as these following a week of research activity, reflect more than simply a memory of my fieldwork experience. They allow me as a researcher, in hindsight, to consider the power relationships and unforeseen moments during fieldwork. These form part of what reflexivity involves.

There are various scholarly definitions of reflexivity. Some of the appropriate ones in my research context include; Mullings (1999), for whom reflexivity applies to data collection processes and power relationships during research. Feminists focus on “power distribution between the researcher and participants” (Finlay: 2002b). These relationships may position the researcher as either ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ (Mullings: 1999). An “outsider” denotes a person conducting fieldwork in a community they do not belong.

Furthermore, young female researchers may experience power relations working in both directions while doing research in an overtly patriarchal field context (Sultana; 2007:380). While institutional ethical clearances aim at minimising harm, the positionality of the researcher (gender, class and ethnicity) shapes the nature of investigation (Dwyer and Buckle: 2009).

I embarked on fieldwork after obtaining institutional ethics approval both at the University and in Uganda.  Semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and notes in a reflexive diary were sources of data. Gatekeeper role in research of this nature was very vital in enabling data collection from some key informants and the focus group participants. I discuss how my positionality (gender and social status) did not neatly fit within the dichotomy between ‘insider’ and ’outsider’. I concur with Etherington (2004) that reflexivity helps to bridge the gap between institutional ethics approval and the actual fieldwork.

My positionality: Insider? Outsider? Both?

Questions like, ‘why are you interested in this study?’ ‘Is this a topic of your choice or the University’s?’ ‘How will the children benefit?’ came up during data collection.

I was neither a complete ‘insider’ nor ‘outsider’, and if the concepts of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ were located on a continuum, I occupied a middle ground. Dwyer and Buckle (2009:60) refer to the middle ground as the hyphen position, one characterised by “paradox, ambiguity and ambivalence, as well as conjunction and disjunction”. As a tribes mate in one of the research areas, some participants considered me an ‘insider’. I was an ‘insider’ prior to the fieldwork, given that I had lived and worked in Uganda, and had over time gained knowledge of the culture and context.

My need for gatekeepers (folks I had made contact with during my professional experience) for data collection however started to affect my perception of how much of an ‘insider’ I was. I was researching among communities where I had not lived while growing up. Sometimes, I felt like an ‘outsider’ among communities where I could not speak/ understand the native language. Given that I was a researcher from a university abroad, respondents asked what the interest of the University was in such a topic. Explaining that abduction in my village indirectly affected me was helpful, yet I still did not pass for a complete ‘insider’ because I never lived there during war. The explanations were however important for building trust.

The influence of my positionality as a researcher

As a female, I met social and moral discussions surrounding females in leadership roles, within politics and academia. Conflicting opinions regarding how some women in politics and academia defied culturally expected norms is prevalent in Ugandan society.

Some of my peers expressed similar sentiments, and wondered which side of the debate I would fall after the PhD. Unknown to me, these kinds of social discourse shaped the ‘silent expectations’ some respondents had from me as an unmarried female researcher from a university in a developed country. A fact I discovered later. It became common before, during or after some interview sessions, to receive advice on the expected role of a woman in marriage, despite her career achievements. During such moments, I would listen to the advice, and find ways of steering the discussion back to the research. The various encounters with advice of this nature, more than ever, shaped my awareness of the impact that the socio-cultural construction of marriage and expected gender norms have on inter-personal interactions like research.

My helpful gatekeepers

My Gatekeepers with whom I had been in touch for about 6-12 months prior to fieldwork, helped build trust among research participants, mobilised for focus group discussions, and offered guidance on security measures to consider while conducting research on sensitive topics among communities recovering from war trauma. They offered advice on the necessary precautions and actions in light of my personal security and that of my participants.

Gatekeepers were helpful in recruiting participants for ‘seeded focus group’ discussions- the ‘seeded focus group’ approach previously used in HIV/AIDS research (Busza et al., 2009)[1], allows for the inclusion of the perspectives of vulnerable people. While recruiting participants, I requested them to ensure a few people related to, or living in homesteads with children born in captivity, participated. I did not know who the seed was during focus group discussions. The intention was to allow them to participate freely.

Taking stock of my fieldwork experience, I agree that reflexivity helps to explore “ethically important moments” in fieldwork and responses to the same (Guillemin and Gillam: 2004). However, since qualitative research is a subjective process, I recognise that another researcher conducting the same research would have a different experience of the fieldwork. However, some issues raised herein, may be relevant to researchers who adopt a ‘seeded focus group’ approach for a research on children born in captivity without being a ‘complete insider’. In addition, researchers involved in any socially, ethnically and politically sensitive research could find these insights useful.

Why Politics Still Matters

By Gerry Stoker. Gerry Stoker is Professor of Governance at University of Southampton (Twitter). You can read more posts by him here.


 

One of UK comedian Bob Monkhouse’s better jokes goes something like this: ‘People laughed at me when I said I wanted to be a comedian; they are not laughing now’. When I published the first edition of Why Politics Matters in 2006- which looked at rising negativity towards democratic politics- there was polite interest at presentations made to politicians and journalists but a sense that my concerns were not exactly the pressing issue of the day. As I publish the second edition for 2017 negativity about the practice of politics is a major news item and anti-politics and post truth politics are terms that have entered everyday debate.

Some politicians are taking advantage of the mood of anti-politics by offering populist stances on issues and by distancing themselves very clearly from something called the ‘political establishment’. The top nominations for 2016 might well have been Donald Trump in the United States and Boris Johnson in Britain, leading the Leave campaign in the EU membership referendum. Other politicians offer convoluted apologies to public audiences for being a politician. Isobel Harding, a journalist at a meeting I was chairing in 2016, argued that she would throw up if she heard another politician explain how they only took up the job ‘by accident’. They were an engineer or doctor – or some other occupation deemed socially acceptable – turned up at some political event and then, seemingly through forces outside their control, found themselves as a candidate for election and then eventually an elected representative.

If politicians fear they are social pariahs as a group, then most citizens would not try to persuade them that the situation is otherwise. In 2011–12, we asked some people in focus groups to indicate what words they associated with politics. The eight most popular grouping covered: deception, corruption, feather-nesting, self-serving, politicking, privileged, boring and incomprehensible. Not a terribly positive list, I think you would agree. We know that millions around the world like the idea of democratic governance in the abstract but struggle to be convinced by the politics essential to its delivery. Why Politics Matters tries to understand this contradiction and, because politics matters, it asks what, if anything, we could do to make it work better.

While the problems and solutions to the current malaise of democratic politics will vary from country to country, I believe that my focus on common features and key comparisons provides a good starting point for discussion of where we are, and what needs to be done. The negative response to politics that many of us share is, I think, a very human reaction to the way politics works. As an intricate mechanism in our multifaceted and complex societies, politics exists because we do not agree with one another. Politics is about choosing between competing interests and views often demanding incompatible allocations of limited resources. Crucially, because it is a collective form of decision making, once a choice has been made then that choice has to be imposed on us all. In the context of greater individualism and a determination to make your own choices the mechanics and institutions of politics can appear out of touch. Yet although social media may be changing the technological expression of politics but it does not mean the fundamental nature of politics has changed. It’s still about making and then imposing collective decisions.

Perhaps there is something in addition about the way that politics is done today that moves citizens from being slightly irked by politics to outright annoyed People don’t like to be taken for a sucker or treated like an idiot. Politics as experienced daily often seems calculated to do exactly that. When politicians debate issues in simplistic terms, when they imply that we can have it all at no cost and appear to manufacture arguments they think will play well to different groups, it is hardly surprising that we think they are taking us for a ride. Nor is it odd that cynicism becomes a common coping response. My book does not berate citizens for not engaging in politics but tries to understand why they often don’t but also how they might be persuaded to do so more. You can’t have democracy without politics. In this light, it’s clear that we need to change some of the practices of politics.

The Second Edition brings into play new research conducted with colleagues over the last decade.  It offers a more comprehensive portrait of rise of political disenchantment in different countries. It provides a fuller and better organised account of many of the competing explanations of that rise in anti-politics. It is updated to deal with the rise of social media, changes in party politics and the rise of populism. Finally, it offers a more extensive discussion of some of the democratic innovations that are being trialled to bring new life to politics.

In truth, the book ends on a slightly more pessimistic note than the First Edition. The Trump campaign and the EU referendum in 2016 seems to have established a new low in politics which is pulling many other actors towards it in a cycle of misinformation, dishonesty, and fear mongering. However, a favourite saying is: ‘a week is a long time in politics’. Perhaps if I ever get round to a third edition I will have something more positive to report. There are many people out there who care about creating a better politics. If my book gives them any ammunition in their battles I will be a happy author.

Gerry Stoker Why Politics Matters Second Edition is available from Palgrave https://he.palgrave.com/page/detail/Why-Politics-Matters/?K=9780230360662