Polling Observatory #29, Conference Season Special #4: The Conservatives

This is the twenty-ninth in a series of posts that report on the state of the parties as measured by opinion polls. By pooling together all the available polling evidence we can reduce the impact of the random variation each individual survey inevitably produces. Most of the short term advances and setbacks in party polling fortunes are nothing more than random noise; the underlying trends – in which we are interested and which best assess the parties’ standings – are relatively stable and little influenced by day-to-day events. If there can ever be a definitive assessment of the parties’ standings, this is it. Further details of the method we use to build our estimates of public opinion can be found here.

Conservatives cropped

The summer saw a slight revival in the fortunes of the Conservatives, clawing back some ground lost during the UKIP surge of the spring of 2013. At their low ebb, immediately after UKIP’s local election breakthrough in May, we estimated the Conservatives at around 28% – they have picked up about 4 points since then.

Although support for the Conservatives has recovered slightly in the last few months, the longer term trend is much less encouraging, as our chart of support since the last general election makes clear. There are short term rises and falls, but the long term trend is clearly in a downward direction. Each slump in support hits new lows, and each rally peaks below the last. In particular, it is clear that the Conservatives lost a large chunk of support following the “omnishambles” budget of March 2012 that they have been unable to recover. Prior to this budget, we estimated Conservative support in the high 30’s. Since it was delivered, the Conservatives have struggled to reach 30%, and even after their latest rally they are still below 32%. Over the past 18 months, Conservative support has fluctuated between 28% and 32%, well below the level of support they need to be the largest party in parliament at the next election, let alone win a majority. Where might hope of a political recovery lie for the Conservatives?

One of the areas where the Conservatives are widely agreed to be in a position of strength is their leader, David Cameron, who consistently out-polls his party and his fellow party leaders with the electorate. Much political science research has highlighted the importance of leaders in electoral success, but the impact on voters is very often over-stated – and is often factored into current support for the parties anyway. Further, while Ed Miliband’s poor ratings with the public signal a vulnerability that the Conservatives might seek to exploit, taking advantage of this is not always straightforward. With recent measures such as the proposed freeze on energy prizes, Miliband has staked out a brand of economic populism that may be difficult to counter – requiring the Conservatives to decide whether to paint him as either weak or dangerous, where the latter may perversely serve to improve his reputation for strong leadership with voters – on issues where the Labour leader also appears to have public opinion on his side. Meanwhile, the self-imposed constraints of austerity budgeting will make it difficult for the Conservatives to offer popular but expensive gifts to the electorate themselves, without undermining their argument that tough budget cuts are economically essential.

Unable to offer voters many gifts in the current economic climate, the Conservatives must therefore place their bets on a recovery before polling day. Economic optimism has been on the rise in recent times, which suggests the government is at least less likely to be punished for its austerity agenda than looked the case when the UK economy was flatlining. With Labour continuing to be blamed by a large section of the public for the state of the economy, the battle for economic credibility will be important as 2015 nears. Indeed, the economy seems to offer most scope to the government for selling a constructive story to voters about its achievements: a recovery will enable the party to claim vindication for its austerity policies and perhaps even offer a few goodies to the electorate. Without recovery, the Conservatives will struggle for a compelling message to win new support. It is not clear that a continued focus on right wing social issues like welfare and immigration can deliver many gains. The electorate has long known where the party stands on these issues, and growing discontent from their Liberal Democrat coalition partners will make further right wing reform in these areas difficult to accomplish, and if the Conservatives campaign on these issues without being able to act on them they risk increasing the appeal of UKIP to frustrated voters. The Conservatives will be looking to set out a clear agenda for a second term, starting with this year’s conference, but the nature of this agenda and their chances of being in government to implement it are now very much in the gift of economic forces beyond their control.

Robert FordWill Jennings and Mark Pickup

Engineering Individual and National Identities

By Dr Ana Margheritis, Politics & International Relations @Ana91224939

Bolivia carried out a national census in 2012. A regular statistical mechanism (and crucial input in public policy) became a political conundrum. Surprisingly, Bolivians learned that the majority do not have an indigenous background. President Evo Morales admitted he was perplexed and later downplayed the importance of the census. Discrepancies between preliminary and final results (with a difference amounting to 300,000 people) cast doubts on the transparency and rigor of the entire process. Criticisms went from the methodology to the qualifications of those who carried out the survey and ended in a reshuffle of technical cadres and top officials at the National Statistical Institute in charge of the procedure. In the light of the new demographic profile, several regions risked losing fiscal resources and seats in parliament. Social protest emerged and the government announced last month that there would be a technical revision of the census.

One of the most interesting “irregularities” of this census was the change in the categories of self-defined ethnicity: for the first time in recent decades, the government eliminated the label mestizo (person of mixed, white-indigenous background) on the basis that such identification was a “colonial and racist” legacy. As a result, the recent census indicates that indigenous groups do not form today the majority of the population, as they did according to the 2001 census when 62% of the population self-identified as mestizos. Back then, Evo Morales’ emerging coalition used that data to claim that groups historically marginalized were to become the new subjects of a re-founded “pluri-national” state. The 2006/7 Constitutional Assembly institutionalized some rights and reallocated fiscal resources accordingly, in a move presented as the end of the neoliberal, oligarchical order and the birth of popular, majority-based democracy. If indigenous are now down to 41% of the population, with the principal groups (aymaras and quechuas) amounting to only 36%, then the official discourse might need some revision and Morales’ quest for a third term next year might be at stake.

Besides becoming a boomerang to Morales’ coalition, the Bolivian census ordeal has at least two implications for scholars, policymakers, and constituencies.

First, we should take census data with a grain of salt, confront it with other, perhaps more reliable sources, and critically examine the politics behind the elaboration of certain categories that help define individual and national identities. This is not just a methodological question. Defining majorities and minorities by reclassifying mestizos or any other group is more than a mathematical exercise. It is a way of dividing the vital core of representative political systems: the demos. It could also be a political tool to boost party clientelism and provide a rationale for who gets what, as if a percentage of the population (non-clients, newly constructed minorities) were not entitled to public goods.

Second, researchers and practitioners alike should be aware of the shifting nature of census categories. The adaptation of census techniques to political needs has not been uncommon in Latin America and elsewhere. Historians have demonstrated that these categories change over time often in response to political and fiscal interests of the state and not in sync with individuals’ self-identification or race; they have also shown that mestizo as an official census category is a post-colonial invention, not a colonial legacy.[1] In other words, Latin American neopopulist governments would benefit from a closer reading of history.


[1] See Thurner, Mark. 1997. From Two Republics to One Divided. Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.